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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government. 
 
The views expressed in the contributions to this Monitor are entirely the
authors’ own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy or
of the G20 Studies Centre. 
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OVERVIEW 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
 
This issue of the Monitor focuses on the role of the G20 in infrastructure, 
tax and energy governance. There is also a note on trade. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
I have an article with reflections from the Financial Flows and 
Infrastructure Financing conference held in Sydney on 20-21 March 
2014. The conference was co-hosted by the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
the Lowy Institute and the Productivity Commission. The conference 
topic was chosen because Australia has prioritised infrastructure during 
its period as G20 chair.  
There have been a vast range of issues raised around infrastructure 
investment, and many were canvassed during the conference. My paper 
therefore proposes there would be value in the G20 identifying the basic 
building blocks that are required if infrastructure investment is going to 
contribute to lifting long-term economic growth and creating jobs. I 
suggest that the core issue is project selection, namely, identifying 
infrastructure projects with the greatest social benefits. This issue is 
currently not given much prominence in the G20 agenda. 
Daniela Strube’s paper focuses on the role of the multilateral 
development banks in helping developing countries lift their infrastructure 
investment. Most of the issues associated with increasing infrastructure 
investment are domestic. But ensuring that the multilateral development 
banks are as effective as possible in assisting developing countries meet 
their infrastructure needs is an ‘international’ aspect of the infrastructure 
agenda worthy of the G20’s attention. 
Susan Harris Rimmer’s article examines the link between the G20’s 
infrastructure and development agendas. She notes that finding 
complementarity between these agenda items is particularly important in 
2014, given Prime Minister Abbott’s claim that he wants to be known as 
the ‘infrastructure prime minister’. Harris Rimmer notes that while 
increasing infrastructure investment is crucial for lifting growth prospects 
in developing countries, the challenge facing the G20 is to make 
infrastructure investment and implementation truly pro-poor. 
                                                          
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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TAX AND DEVELOPMENT 
Claire Spoors and Serena Lillywhite’s paper focuses on the link between 
the G20’s priority to combat base erosion and profit shifting and its 
objective to promote development. They highlight that one of the most 
practical steps the G20 could take to increase the domestic revenue 
raising capacity of developing countries would be to support the 
disclosure of tax payments made by corporate entities on a country-by-
country basis. 
ENERGY GOVERNANCE 
Hugh Jorgensen’s paper emphasises the need for enhanced global 
energy governance and suggests that this is an issue that should be on 
the agenda for G20 leaders. He points out that while the G20 currently 
has a number of energy issues on its work program, it has not 
adequately addressed the prior need for a revision of the global energy 
governance system itself. Specifically, one outcome that could come 
from the Brisbane G20 Summit is the acknowledgement of the need for 
a global forum that explicitly focuses on energy challenges, and that 
brings together all the major countries that will most heavily rely upon 
global energy markets in the twenty-first century on an equal basis. 
TRADE 
Shinichi Kitajima provides a brief update on developments in the global 
trading system and highlights the role that the G20 can play in promoting 
trade liberalisation. He notes that the meeting of G20 trade ministers in 
July 2014 will occur during a crucial period, as July is also the deadline 
for WTO members to pledge to implement the trade facilitation agenda 
adopted at the Bali meeting of trade ministers last year. 
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G20 AND INFRASTRUCTURE: 
FOCUSING ON THE 
FUNDAMENTALS 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
INTRODUCTION 
On 20-21 March 2014, the Reserve Bank of Australia, Productivity 
Commission and Lowy Institute jointly hosted a conference titled 
Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing.2 The topic was selected 
because of the priority that Australia has placed on infrastructure as an 
agenda item during its term as G20 chair in 2014.  
This paper contains reflections on the conference and suggestions for 
what the G20’s priorities should be in seeking to increase infrastructure 
investment. Australia has said its main focus is to increase the proportion 
of private sector capital in infrastructure investment. However an 
important outcome from the conference is that the most fundamental 
task should be ensuring that the ‘right’ infrastructure projects are 
selected. The importance of project selection currently does not receive 
much attention within the G20, where the focus is largely on how to tap 
private sector capital flows, particularly pension funds. But ensuring that 
the right infrastructure projects are selected is more important than the 
question of how they will be financed. Identifying and selecting the right 
infrastructure projects is a challenging task. As such, the G20 should 
designate appropriate project selection as the foundation stone of its 
infrastructure agenda. 
THE CONTEXT: G20 AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Infrastructure has been identified by Australia as a priority for the G20 in 
2014. The Prime Minister noted in a speech at the start of Australia’s 
G20 presidency: “as an infrastructure prime minister, my hope as G20 
host is to bring policy-makers, financiers and builders together to identify 
practical ways of increasing long-term infrastructure financing”.3 
But infrastructure is not a new priority for the G20. At previous G20 
summits, leaders have endorsed the importance of infrastructure 
                                                          
1	Director, G20 Studies Centre. Lowy Institute for International Policy.	
2 The draft conference papers are available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2014/index.html. The Reserve Bank of 
Australia will be publishing the conference papers and a summary of the discussions in 
July 2014. 
3 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 
Switzerland,” 23 January 2014, Available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-01-
23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
…ensuring that the right 
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investment to growth and jobs and have committed to lift infrastructure 
investment. For example: 
• At the Seoul Summit in 2010, as part of the Multi-Year Action Plan on 
Development, leaders said they were committed to overcoming 
obstacles to infrastructure investment, developing project pipelines, 
improving capacity and facilitating increased finance for infrastructure 
investment.4 
• Prior to the Cannes Summit in 2011, a high-level panel was 
established to identify measures to scale up and diversify sources of 
financing for infrastructure, make projects bankable and enhance 
knowledge by sharing skills with low-income countries.5 
• At the Los Cabos Summit in 2012, leaders emphasised that 
infrastructure is critical for sustained economic growth, poverty 
reduction and job creation. They noted that while public financing of 
infrastructure development projects remained critical, it should be 
complemented by private sector investment.6 
• At the St Petersburg Summit in 2013, leaders re-emphasised the key 
role of long-term investment, particularly in infrastructure, and 
committed to put in place the conditions that would promote financing 
for infrastructure investment, including mobilising private investment.7 
 
The challenge for Australia is to move beyond the rhetoric of 
emphasising the importance of infrastructure investment and deliver on 
the Prime Minister’s commitment that under his watch the G20 will 
deliver tangible outcomes. Indeed, with G20 leaders regularly 
emphasising the importance of infrastructure investment, it is curious 
that the top infrastructure priority of the B20 for the Brisbane Summit is 
that there needs to be a “strong affirmation of the critical importance of 
infrastructure and investment as a key part of the G20 vision”.8 
Infrastructure is already an established part of the G20 agenda.  
The narrative painted by Australia so far is that there is a worldwide 
infrastructure gap that cannot be totally financed by the public sector, 
particularly given that many countries are constrained by high public 
                                                          
4 G20, “Annex II to G20 Leader's Communique: Multi-Year Action Plan on 
Development,” (Seoul 2010). 
5 “Cannes Summit Final Declaration - Building Our Common Future: Renewed 
Collective Action for the Benefit of All,” 2011, Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html. 
6 “G-20 Leaders Los Cabos Declaration,” 2012, Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html. 
7 “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (6 September 2013) Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. 
8 G20 Studies Centre, G20 Monitor No.9: Perspectives from Business, Civil Society, 
Labour, Think Tanks and Youth (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014). 
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debt levels. There is, however, no shortage of private capital available to 
finance infrastructure – the central challenge is to unlock this private 
capital, particularly pension funds, so that it can be used to lift 
infrastructure investment. As Prime Minister Abbott stated “it should be 
easier to get big new road, rail, pipe and dam infrastructure off the 
ground and we can do that through attracting more private capital”.9 
Similarly, the Australian Treasurer, Joe Hockey, said that the 
centrepiece of the G20 agenda under the Australian chair would be “to 
undertake domestic reforms that tangibly improve the investment 
environment and so unlock private sector investment, particularly in the 
area of infrastructure”.10 
 
THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE FUNDAMENTALS – 
PROJECT SELECTION 
Focusing on the financing of infrastructure investment, particularly 
boosting private sector investment, raises a wide range of issues. As 
Treasurer Hockey outlined, an important task for all countries is to 
improve their domestic investment climate. This involves ensuring 
macroeconomic and political stability and providing certainty for investors 
in such areas as regulation, taxation, accounting and governance. With 
the aim to lift private sector involvement, attention inevitably turns to the 
role of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the contractual challenges 
of dealing with the range of risks associated with the construction and 
operation of infrastructure projects.  
Another dimension of infrastructure financing is the impact of post-crisis 
regulatory initiatives on the traditional project financiers, particularly in 
the construction phase, namely commercial banks. Banks are facing 
credit constraints as part of new regulatory requirements and their 
investment horizon has been shortened. This leads to the importance of 
developing capital markets, particularly in developing countries. 
Multilateral development banks can make a significant contribution to the 
establishment of such markets, both as a source of infrastructure finance 
for developing countries and also through the provision of technical 
assistance and capacity building. 
From the business perspective, the B20 appear to be focusing on 
‘transaction’ issues associated with infrastructure financing. For 
example, they have identified the need for a stock of long-term 
‘bankable’ infrastructure projects (which will encourage institutional 
investors to develop the skills to analyse investment projects), the 
standardisation of the process and materials for the preparation of 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 Joe Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation and 
Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute,” 6 February 2014, Available at: 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/speech/001-2014/. 
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projects, and time limits on regulatory and environmental assessment 
processes.11 
All of these elements are relevant to increasing infrastructure investment 
and the G20 has launched initiatives dealing with most of them. But it 
makes for a crowded agenda and there has been little effort by the G20 
to prioritise its efforts. While the cost of bidding for a PPP may be high, it 
is not clear that high bidding costs and a lack of standardisation of 
processes, materials and documentation for infrastructure projects – as 
called for by the B20 – are key impediments to increased infrastructure 
investment. If the G20 is going to deliver tangible outcomes on this issue 
in 2014, the first task should be to prioritise its efforts and identify the 
fundamental areas where it can boost infrastructure investment that 
contributes to supporting long-term economic growth. In this context, the 
main observation from the Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing 
conference is that the top priority of the G20 should be to ensure that the 
‘right’ infrastructure projects are selected. Specifically, too much attention 
is presently being focused on how infrastructure can be financed, rather 
than ensuring that the funds are being channelled towards supporting 
the most appropriate projects. 
This was a key point in a paper presented to the conference by Poole, 
Toohey and Harris.12 They noted that the focus on project financing 
options presumes that a decision has already been made as to whether 
investment is the best use of limited resources. Specifically, they point 
out “given that the source of financing itself cannot fundamentally alter 
the economics of a project, a necessary first step is ensuring that good 
projects, that is ones that generate net social benefits, are chosen”. In a 
similar vein, the main conclusion from the paper by Galetovic, Engel and 
Fischer is that in selecting infrastructure projects, the financing is 
irrelevant.13 
Bertrand Badre from the World Bank recently made a similar point in 
observing that the promotion of infrastructure investment necessarily 
requires more than money.	 14 Badre observes that some countries 
generate massive growth benefits from their infrastructure spending, 
while others hardly see a return. The lesson Badre draws is that 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Emily Poole, Carl Toohey, and Peter Harris, “Public Infrastructure: A Framework for 
Decision Making” (paper presented at the Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing 
conference, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, 20-21 March 2014). Available at: 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2014/pdf/harris-toohey-poole.pdf. 
13 Alexander Galetovic, Eduardo Engel, and Ronald Fischer, “Finance and Public-
Private Partnerships” (paper presented at the Financial Flows and Infrastructure 
Financing conference, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, 20-21 March 2014). 
Available at: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2014/pdf/engel-fischer-
galetovic.pdf. 
14 Bertrand Badré, “Infrastructure Unbound,” Project Syndicate, 26 March 2014, 
Available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bertrand-badre-cautions-
that-money-is-not-enough-in-meeting-countries--public-investment-needs. 
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governments must pay more attention to the selection, quality and 
management of infrastructure projects as well as to the quality of the 
underlying investment environment. 
The importance of project selection is fundamental, but many countries 
do not have adequate processes in place to ensure optimal selection. 
Moreover, emphasising the need to rapidly close the large global 
investment gap, along with suggestions from the B20 that governments 
should set specific targets for lifting infrastructure spending, runs the 
danger of excessively emphasising quantity over quality in the pursuit of 
infrastructure investment. The same concerns arise when an increase in 
infrastructure spending is used for demand management purposes and 
as a way to boost short-term economic growth. In these circumstances it 
is more likely that governments will build ‘bridges to nowhere’. There are 
‘white elephant’ infrastructure projects in most countries and the quest to 
lift infrastructure investment, be it publically or privately financed, cannot 
be at the expense of rigorous processes to ensure that the highest value 
projects are selected. 
This was the key point in the Australian Productivity Commission’s 
recent draft report on public infrastructure.15 The overall message in the 
report is the need for a comprehensive overhaul of processes in the 
assessment and development of public infrastructure projects. As the 
Productivity Commission notes, without reforms, more spending will 
simply increase the cost of infrastructure to users, taxpayers, and the 
community generally and lead to the provision of wasted infrastructure.16 
While the Productivity Commission’s draft report refers to Australia, the 
conclusions are likely to be relevant to many G20 countries. 
One of the factors that works against the selection of the right 
infrastructure projects is the tendency for governments to select projects 
for political reasons or because they are popular rather than because 
they generate the highest net social returns. This was captured by Henry 
Ergas when he noted  
“The incentive in political decision-making leads to an undue 
emphasis on ‘ribbon cutting’ opportunities, generally associated 
with very major (‘mega’) projects, at the expense of periodic 
maintenance and of small-scale ‘de-bottlenecking’ options that 
could postpone or even avoid the need for more costly asset 
expansions”. 
 
                                                          
15 Productivity Commission, “Public Infrastructure, Draft Inquiry Report,” (Canberra, 
March 2014) Available at: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/134674/infrastructure-draft-
volume1.pdf. 
16 Ibid. 
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BETTER PRICING OF INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES 
The comment from Ergas raises another factor working against the 
selection of the most appropriate projects, and that is the failure to use 
existing infrastructure as effectively as possible. In many respects this 
comes down to poor pricing and regulatory policies by governments. For 
example, as noted in the conference paper by Winston, the way to deal 
with road congestion is not to build more roads.17 It will require the use of 
congestion charges, so as to encourage the use of existing roads more 
efficiently, along with better urban planning. The failure to properly price 
the services from infrastructure not only results in their inefficient use, it 
also represents a barrier to increased private sector financing. 
The good news is that the ability to better price the services from 
infrastructure, so that they are used more efficiently and are thus more 
attractive candidates for private financing, is being facilitated with 
advances in technology. An obvious example is how technology can 
allow the application of congestion charges without disrupting journeys. 
Winston outlines many other examples where technology is allowing the 
more efficient use of infrastructure. This includes weigh-in-motion 
technology that can monitor the contribution to road damage caused by 
trucks, and satellite-based air traffic control systems that can improve the 
efficiency of airports over older radar systems. He also raises the 
fundamental question as to why these new technologies are not being 
applied universally, and why governments continue with policies that 
result in the inefficient use of existing infrastructure, thereby impeding 
new investment. In the US context, Winston says that some of the 
factors working against the uptake of new technologies include agency 
limitations, a bias towards the status quo, regulatory constraints and 
political factors – such as the electorate not wanting to pay tolls or higher 
charges. No doubt these or similar factors are at work in other G20 
countries, suggesting that one of the most important public policy 
challenges that governments face is to change community attitudes so 
that infrastructure can be used more efficiently. 
ARE GOVERNMENTS THE PROBLEM? 
Governments generally take the lead role in infrastructure development. 
This is often to ensure equitable access to infrastructure services (such 
as providing services to those who are not able to pay), to counter 
market failures (that occur when not enough of the good or service is 
being provided or natural monopolies have arisen), or for historical and 
cultural reasons. But as noted, governments can be the main 
                                                          
17 Clifford Winston, “The Private Sector’s Potential to Improve Public Transportation 
Infrastructure: With and without Privatization” (paper presented at the Financial Flows 
and Infrastructure Financing conference, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, 20-21 
March 2014). Available at: 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2014/pdf/winston.pdf. 
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impediment to the efficient use of existing infrastructure and political 
influences can result in inferior infrastructure investments. 
The B20’s response to pressures that result in governments selecting 
less efficient infrastructure projects is to recommend that “G20 
governments and business jointly develop long-term bankable 
infrastructure plans for each country, supported by objective, 
independent assessments of national priorities, and freed from the 
uncertainties of the political cycle”.18 While such a recommendation from 
the business community is understandable, and Australia has a degree 
of independent assessment over infrastructure investments through the 
operations of Infrastructure Australia, it is questionable whether it will 
gain much traction among G20 countries. The recommendation 
effectively says that governments cannot be trusted with infrastructure 
planning and project selection and that the direct involvement of 
business in the planning process would result in better outcomes.  
As noted, a range of factors account for why governments have 
historically being largely responsible for the provision of infrastructure. 
These cannot be ignored. Moreover the cost-benefit analysis associated 
with selecting infrastructure projects is different from the financial 
analysis of investment undertaken by firms. The cost-benefit assessment 
for infrastructure has to be broad and take into account social, 
distributional and environmental considerations. These are ultimately 
matters for which governments have to take responsibility. In addition, 
when the B20 says that the infrastructure selection process has to be 
freed from the ‘uncertainties of the political cycle’, this could also be 
interpreted as saying that it should not form part of the accountability 
process of a democratic political system. 
The key requirement to improve infrastructure planning and project 
selection is transparency. In many respects it does not matter who 
undertakes project assessments, provided all the factors taken into 
account in making a decision are fully disclosed and available for public 
scrutiny. It would be a notable achievement if G20 countries committed 
to make the selection of infrastructure projects fully transparent, for this 
would help not only improve the quantity but also the quality of 
infrastructure investments. 
 
CAUTION WITH PPPS 
The overall flavour from the conference papers and discussion on the 
use of PPPs was ‘be careful’; PPPs are not a magic bullet for increasing 
infrastructure investment. Engel, Fisher and Galetovic conclude in their 
paper that whether a PPP makes sense depends almost exclusively on 
the economic characteristics of the infrastructure, not on the way it is 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
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financed or funded. PPPs can work when objective performance 
standards can be written into a contract between the public authority and 
the private firm. The authors also argue that the notion that PPPs 
liberate public funds for other investments is a mirage, for PPPs affect 
the inter-temporal public budget in much the same way as the public 
provision of infrastructure. PPPs do not free up government resources 
per se. One of the main advantages of PPPs from the government 
perspective is that they allow investments while keeping future 
obligations off balance sheets and outside parliamentary control. 
In terms of the decision to use private financing through a PPP, the 
questions that need to be assessed are whether it would result in lower 
production costs, better maintenance, and a higher level of service than 
if the investment was financed totally by public funds. This comes back 
to the basic point that the G20’s focus should be on the selection, design 
and characteristics of infrastructure investment, rather than just on how it 
is financed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In past summits, G20 leaders have said that infrastructure investment 
was critical for growth and was a priority. Australia has nominated 
infrastructure financing, particularly the involvement of the private sector, 
as a priority for the G20 in 2014. The danger is that this can lead to a 
crowded agenda, with various aspects of infrastructure financing being 
pursued. There would be value in the G20 identifying the basic building 
blocks that are necessary if increased infrastructure investment is going 
to contribute to lifting long-term growth and creating jobs. And the most 
basic building block is appropriate project selection. Notwithstanding its 
importance, it does not appear to have thus far been given a prominent 
role in the G20’s work on infrastructure investment. The focus has been 
on the financing of infrastructure. However, the selection of infrastructure 
projects is as important, if not more important, than the funding and 
financing arrangements used to deliver them. 
It is hoped that the comprehensive growth strategies that G20 
governments will be presenting at the Brisbane Summit will include 
requirements and reforms that ensure the most appropriate 
infrastructure projects are selected. And the core component of these 
reforms should be complete transparency over the factors that are taken 
into account in the project selection process. 
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MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS, THE 
G20 AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
DANIELA STRUBE1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The world is facing a significant global infrastructure gap. The consulting 
firm McKinsey & Company estimates that in the period to 2030, USD 57 
trillion, or 3.5 per cent of global GDP, is required to support projected 
GDP growth.2 This represents a surge of almost 60 per cent over the 
USD 36 trillion that has been spent since 1995.3 These are monumental 
figures. However, as infrastructure investment is largely a domestic 
policy issue, the question often raised in the context of processes like the 
G20 is how international summits can actually contribute to lifting 
infrastructure investment. This paper suggests that strengthening the 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) and thereby enabling them to 
play a significant role in supporting infrastructure investment in 
developing countries constitutes a clear international dimension of 
infrastructure investment. This is one area where the G20 may be able 
to use its political impetus to make a valuable contribution.  
There have been a number of attempts to quantify the impact of 
infrastructure on growth. The World Bank’s Infrastructure Strategy 
Update FY2012-2015 finds that a 10 per cent expansion in infrastructure 
investment correlates with a 1 per cent increase in growth.4 The 
credibility of any such analysis is limited by endemic problems related to 
modelling, measurement, data availability, heterogeneity and most 
importantly, establishing causation. However, economic theory is very 
clear on the existence of a positive relationship between infrastructure 
and economic growth and there is an overwhelming consensus on this 
issue in the economics profession.5 Moreover, more recently, 
                                                          
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 McKinsey Global Institute, “Infrastructure Productivity: How to Save $1 Trillion a Year,” 
(January 2013) Available at: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/engineering_construction/infrastructure_productivity. 
3 Ibid. 
4 World Bank Group, Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015, (Washington DC, 
2011) Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINFRA/Resources/Transformationthroughinfrastru
cture.pdf.  
5 David Aschauer, “Is Public Expenditure Productive?,” Journal of Monetary Economics 
23 (1989); Luis Serven, “Infrastructure and Growth,” (World Bank, January 2010) 
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infrastructure has been associated with important benefits for equality 
and social development.6 
The Australian G20 presidency has identified infrastructure and 
investment as a priority for the G20 in 2014.7 This primarily stems from 
the concern that sub-optimal infrastructure endowments may 
significantly undermine growth prospects for the global economy. The 
global financial crisis and its negative implications for business activity 
and public budgets have raised additional concerns about the likelihood 
of the world being able to effectively address the global infrastructure 
gap, especially regarding the significant investment needs in developing 
countries. For example, European banks have historically been a main 
source of infrastructure finance, but are now facing significant 
consolidation challenges.	8 More generally, fiscal pressures in advanced 
countries are also likely to have contributed to a trend of further 
reductions in bilateral official development assistance that could have 
been directed to supporting infrastructure investment.9 Since these 
traditional actors (advanced countries’ banks and aid budgets) are 
severely constrained, multilateral development banks have been called 
upon to further strengthen their role in infrastructure investment.10 This 
paper looks at how and why the G20 might catalyse a greater role for the 
MDBs. 
 
                                                                                                                             
Available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentM
DK:22629797~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469382~isCURL:Y,00.ht
ml. 
6 United Nations Human Settlements Programme, “Infrastructure for Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa,” (Nairobi, 2012) Available at: 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/UN-HabitatReport.pdf. 
7 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “G20 2014: Overview of Australia's 
Presidency,” (Canberra, 20 January 2014) Available at: 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G20Australia2014conceptp
aper.pdf. 
8 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015,” (Washington DC, October 
2013) Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/W
B-PREM%20financing-for-development-pub-10-11-13web.pdf. 
9 OECD Newsroom, “Aid to Poor Countries Slips Further as Governments Tighten 
Budgets,” OECD, 3 April 2013, Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbud
gets.htm. 
10 In this article, the term ‘multilateral development banks’ is used to refer to the World 
Bank Group, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Sub-regional development banks are not explicitly included under 
this definition. 
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ADDITIONALITY 
Promoting infrastructure investment has traditionally been a core role of 
the MDBs. However, over the last two decades, infrastructure has 
become relatively smaller as a component within their operations, as 
their mandates have expanded into other areas such as health and 
education. Given this broader set of priorities, it is all the more important 
that the MDBs’ engagement in fostering infrastructure investment is as 
efficient and effective as possible. ‘Additionality’ is the key test to 
determine how and where the MDBs can meaningfully contribute to 
promoting infrastructure investment. Within the context of this paper, 
additionality refers to the critical hurdle of determining whether a project 
would have gone ahead without MDB involvement.  
MBDs provide various dimensions of additionality in the area of 
infrastructure investment. Financial additionality covers their ability to 
attract funding from other sources based on the official ‘stamp of 
approval’ that MDB involvement in a project implies. This is often 
referred to as the MDBs’ ‘core’ catalytic role.11 Policy additionality refers 
to the MDBs’ indirect role in fostering infrastructure investment by 
addressing the underlying investment conditions within a given market, 
for example by providing technical assistance in areas such as capital 
market development, governance and regulation.12 In some instances, 
this ‘indirect’ catalytic role may prove to be even more important than 
their financial contribution.13 Other related dimensions of additionality 
include demonstration additionality (demonstrating potential success by 
supporting ‘first-mover’ projects), design additionality (in project design 
and implementation) and selection additionality (through improved 
project selection on the basis of strict governance and accountability 
standards).14 Lastly, MDBs also provide additionalities within the 
dimension of political economy – MDBs may serve as a ‘scapegoat’ for 
                                                          
11 A variety of factors is attributed to creating this financial additionality, including the 
MDB’s solid finances and in particular their preferred creditor status, their long-standing 
technical expertise in countries all over the world, their long-term outlook and their strict 
adherence to governance and project standards in project selection and 
implementation. These advantages also may allow MDBs to secure better financing 
terms, such as lower rates and longer maturities, for a project. See: Willem Buiter and 
Steven Fries, “What Should the Multilateral Development Banks Do” (paper presented 
at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics - Europe, June 
2001). Available at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0074.pdf; Jeff 
Chelsky, Claire Morel, and Mabruk Kabir, Investment Financing in the Wake of the 
Crisis: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks, World Bank Economic Premise, no. 
121 (2013). 
12 Investment Financing in the Wake of the Crisis: The Role of Multilateral Development 
Banks. 
13 Jeff Chelsky and Claire Morel, “Official-Sector Non-Concessional Long-Term 
Financing: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks” (paper presented at the 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting, Moscow, 15-16 February 
2013). 
14 Chelsky, Morel, and Kabir, Investment Financing in the Wake of the Crisis: The Role 
of Multilateral Development Banks. 
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politically sensitive decisions that are associated with a project.15 
Alternatively, MDB conditionality may provide borrower countries with a 
justification for the need for reform, while an MDB’s reputation as an 
‘honest broker’ may help foster policy change that ultimately contributes 
to improving investment environments. 
 
ADDITIONALITY AS A CRITERIA FOR MDB 
ASSISTANCE 
Additionality is not only crucial in evaluating the rationale for the MDB’s 
specific activities in infrastructure investment, it is also useful in 
determining who should receive assistance from the MDBs.  
Emerging economies are increasingly able to draw upon alternatives to 
the traditional MDBs while financing their investment needs. With growth 
in both their economies and their savings, they now have a much greater 
ability to access international financial markets and pay off remaining 
debt to the MDBs. In addition, emerging economies are also increasingly 
active in setting up entirely new organisations to complement the 
traditional MDBs, such as the proposed BRICS bank and the new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank.16 The latter’s official launch may take 
place as early as the APEC meeting in China in November 2014.17 Such 
developments are a testimony to the emerging economies’ willingness 
and ability to create alternatives to financing agencies that have 
historically been dominated by Western or developed country interests. 
The financial weight of these new actors is already substantial. In 2011, 
concessional funding from emerging economies to low-income countries 
(USD 12-15 billion) was at a similar level to the funding allocated by 
donors in the Organisation for Economic Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) towards official development 
assistance (ODA) (USD 16-17 billion).18 China is the most important 
player among emerging economy donors.19 China also has a particular 
focus on funding infrastructure projects.20 Other non-traditional partners 
include private philanthropy and vertical funds. In 2012, private donors 
                                                          
15 Rebecca M. Nelsen, “Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for 
Congress,” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 November 2013) 
Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41170.pdf. 
16 Banyan, “An Asian Infrastructure Bank,” The Economist, 2013, Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/10/asian-infrastructure-bank-1. 
17 Andrew Elek, “The Potential Role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” East 
Asia Forum, 11 February 2014, Available at: 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/11/the-potential-role-of-the-asian-infrastructure-
investment-bank/. 
18 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015.” 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
Additionality is not only 
crucial in evaluating the 
rationale for the MDB’s 
specific activities in 
infrastructure investment, 
it is also useful in 
determining who should 
receive assistance from 
the MDBs. 
 INFRASTRUCTURE, TAX, ENERGY 
 
17
 
provided funds amounting to about half (USD 60-70 billion) of the 
combined ODA of the OECD-DAC members.21 
Infrastructure-specific data conveys a similar picture. 2006 data from the 
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility shows that more than a 
third of total infrastructure financing comes from non-traditional partners 
(USD 8 billion).22 This is of a similar magnitude to the level of private 
investment and it is significantly greater than traditional concessional 
infrastructure financing (USD 5 billion). For sub-Saharan Africa, the 
World Bank also emphasises the significant role played by non-
traditional financing sources. Average infrastructure capital expenditure 
between 2001 and 2006 by the private sector is equal with public sector 
spending (at USD 9.4 billion).23 ODA adds another USD 3.6 billion, while 
non-OECD financiers provided USD 2.5 billion over the same period.24 It 
can be expected that emerging economies will further gain in importance 
as funding sources, even if this is only due to an increase in their relative 
share of global wealth. Growth in emerging markets will, ceteris paribus, 
expand their share in global development funding for infrastructure.25  
However, with the emergence of new actors comes the risk of 
fragmentation of assistance. Different donors tend to focus on different 
types of infrastructure or financing arrangements. Non-traditional 
partners tend to focus on investments in power and transport while 
private sector engagement has been primarily in telecommunications 
infrastructure.26 The public sector, including MDBs, often focuses on 
areas that are less attractive to private and non-traditional financiers. It 
remains to be seen whether emerging country-led funding organisations 
will provide a similarly broad coverage of projects. 
Despite taking on new responsibilities as lenders of investment finance, 
major emerging economies have also remained active customers of the 
MDBs. This is evident in Figure 1, which shows that more than three-
quarters of MDB funding goes to middle-income countries.27 Low-income 
countries do not get significantly more assistance than high-income 
countries. Among middle-income countries, there is also a slight bias 
towards upper middle-income countries, which receive more than 40 per 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, “Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation,” (Washington DC: Agence Française de Développement and the World 
Bank, 2010) Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/aicd_overview_english_no-
embargo.pdf. 
24 Ibid. 
25 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015.” 
26 Ibid. 
27 Figure 1 is based on the author’s own calculations on the basis of the FY 2013 data 
provided in: Nelsen, “Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for 
Congress.” The figures for the ADB include assistance from the Asian Development 
Fund. 
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cent of overall assistance. The breakdown for the individual MDBs is 
shown in Figure 2.28 Even the International Development Association 
(IDA), the concessional funding arm of the World Bank, commits less 
than half of its funding to low-income countries. The rest is given to lower 
middle-income countries. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is the 
MDB that is most active in working with low-income countries (LICs), but 
it still commits less than 20 per cent of its investment to the poorest 
countries.  
Figure 1: Recipients of MDB financial assistance 
 
 
                                                          
28 Figure 2 is based on the author’s own calculations on the basis of the FY 2013 data 
provided in: ibid. The figures for the ADB include assistance from the Asian 
Development Fund. 
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Figure 1: Recipients of MDB financial assistance 
 
 
Figure 2: Recipients of MDB financial assistance – institutional breakdown 
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The BRICS receive a significant share of MDB funding. In fact, Brazil 
(USD 6552 million), China (USD 4399 million), India (USD 4309 million) 
and Russia (USD 4226), respectively represent the four countries that 
receive the largest amount of MDB assistance. Only the IDA and the 
AfDB do not have a BRICS nation as their top recipient of assistance.29 
Intense debate has been sparked over whether MDBs should continue 
to lend to emerging countries, especially those with access to private 
capital markets and significant reserves, such as Brazil and China. As 
emerging economies are such significant MDB borrowers, this is not just 
a matter of principle, but also has important implications for the 
resources available to MDBs. 
 
However, for some emerging economies, access to private capital 
markets is limited. Only about 20 middle-income countries have 
appropriate access to private capital markets at the national level. This 
excludes subnational governments as well as the rest of the developing 
world. While private participation in infrastructure has never been higher 
than in FY2010 (USD 160 billion), LICs have received virtually none of 
these flows. This clearly supports the case for MDB lending to be 
primarily channelled towards LICs, while some emerging countries that 
have extensive government reserves and/or access to private capital 
markets may not require additional financial support to address potential 
infrastructure gaps. 
 
ADDITIONALITY AND THE MDBS AS CATALYSTS FOR 
REFORM 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, developed countries have 
been unwilling to support the growth of the MDBs’ balance sheets.30 This 
has led to greater efforts from MDBs to leverage investment from the 
private sector, in the spirit of their ‘core catalytic role’.31 This is mentioned 
as a key concern in the World Bank’s Infrastructure Strategy Update 
FY2012-2015.32  
The benefits from including the private sector in MDB infrastructure 
projects are evident. In addition to financial contributions, the private 
                                                          
29 Based on the author’s own calculations on the basis of the FY 2013 data provided in: 
ibid. 
30 Johannes F. Linn, “Realizing the Potential of the Multilateral Development Banks,” 
The Brookings Institution, September 2013, Available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/09/multilateral-development-banks-
linn. 
31 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015.” 
32 Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
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sector will bring an efficiency focus and an entrepreneurial mind-set to 
the table. Involving domestic companies can also contribute to private 
sector development in the host country. At the same time, the evidence 
regarding private-public partnerships (PPPs) is mixed.33 PPPs are 
complex instruments, to the extent that countries with weak 
administrative capacities may not be able to implement them effectively 
even with technical assistance from MDBs.34 PPPs are also prone to 
information asymmetries which may cause moral hazard.35 The World 
Bank acknowledges the problems inherent in PPPs in terms of their 
complexity, as well as the associated difficulty of making a sizeable 
positive social impact through the use of PPPs.36  
It is therefore important that, while generally promoting private sector 
involvement where appropriate, MDBs do not have a ‘PPP bias’ for 
every project. They should remain neutral prior to a project assessment 
and not presume to know the best financing and implementation 
arrangements for that project. Private sector development is a desirable 
secondary goal and should be promoted wherever it is an efficient 
approach, but it should not supersede the MDBs’ preoccupation with 
value for money. Given these intrinsic challenges associated with private 
investment in some areas of infrastructure, it is doubtful that it is 
sufficient to address the infrastructure gap in developing countries in the 
absence of public involvement.  
A more dedicated commitment to innovative financing, so as to increase 
the productivity of existing resources, may be a promising solution to the 
funding dilemma. Guillermo Perry is among those who argue that the 
MDBs have a tendency to be overly risk-averse and conservative in their 
uptake of financial innovation.37 Two major areas should be prioritised in 
addressing this issue: the provision of guarantees/risk mitigation and the 
development of local currency markets.  
                                                          
33 OECD and International Transport Forum, “Better Regulation of Public-Private 
Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure: Summary and Conclusions,” ITF Round 
Tables, No. 151 (2013); Clive Harris, Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing 
Countries: Trends, Impacts, and Policy Lessons (Washington: World Bank Publications, 
2003); Antonio Estache and Caroline Philippe, “The Impact of Private Participation in 
Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Taking Stock of About 20 Years of Experience,” 
ECARES working paper 2012-043 (2012). 
34 Stephen Grenville, “Financing for Infrastructure - What Contribution Can the G20 
Make?,” in G20 Monitor No. 6: Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013); Maria Monica Wihardja, “Looking 
at G20 Initiatives on Infrastructure Investment from a Developing Country's Perspective: 
Indonesia,” in G20 Monitor No. 6: Tax, Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the 
G20 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
35 See for example Dennis De Clerck, Erik Demeulemeester, and Willy Herroelen, 
“Public Private Partnerships: Look before You Leap into Marriage,” Review of Business 
and Economic Literature 57, no. 3 (2012). 
36 World Bank Group, Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
37 Guillermo Perry, Beyond Lending: How Multilateral Banks Can Help Developing 
Countries Manage Volatility (Washington: Centre for Global Development, 2009). 
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Risk mitigation is the most obvious instrument for MDB involvement. It 
highlights the principle of crowding in other (private sector) resources 
and, most importantly, specifically targets the economic problem of 
excessive non-commercial risk that constrains infrastructure investment 
in many emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). MDB 
assistance should particularly focus on projects where the viability gap is 
caused by non-commercial risks. First-loss guarantees can also be of 
particular value. If an equity tranche is included in the deal, the issuer 
can also participate in the upside risk of the project.38 MDBs, such as the 
World Bank with its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
are active in the area of risk mitigation, but they are in a position to 
pursue a more aggressive strategy and take on more risks in this area.39  
 
The World Bank has recently proposed additional efforts to address 
these shortcomings by creating exposure exchange agreements 
between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and MIGA as well as with regional MDBs. This is designed to reduce 
concentration risk, and in turn possibly lead to an increase in the 
productivity of agency resources.40 In the context of the proposed Global 
Infrastructure Facility, the Bank has also committed to working towards 
the establishment of a new investment asset class for long-term 
investors such as institutional investors.41 The International Finance 
Corporation is extending its efforts in the area of managing third-party 
capital funds, specifically targeting institutional and non-bank investors.42 
The other area where the potential additionality of MDBs is under-utilised 
is in local currency markets. Strengthening local currency markets is 
important, because insufficient market depth represents a level of 
elevated risk to global investment decision-makers that are otherwise 
more familiar with, and biased in favour of, advanced markets. Despite 
increasingly strong fundamentals in EMDEs, both investors from 
advanced economies and EMDEs themselves seem reluctant to pursue 
opportunities in these markets.  
The MDBs have recently increased their efforts in this area. Examples 
include the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX), the Global Emerging 
Markets Local Currency Bond Program (Gemloc) and the Efficient 
                                                          
38 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015.” 
39 43% of all MIGA guarantees in the FY 2011 were for infrastructure projects. See: 
Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
40 World Bank Group Staff, “Optimizing World Bank Group Resources and Supporting 
Infrastructure Financing” (paper presented at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors meeting, Washington DC, World Bank, 14 April 2014). Available at: 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Optimizing%20World%20B
ank%20Group%20Resources%20and%20Supporting%20Infrastructure%20Financing.p
df. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Securities Markets Institutional Development (ESMID) Africa program. 
However, given the continuing lack of market depth in EMDEs and the 
fact that the MDBs are well placed to deal with this policy area, more 
effort is required. The viability of local currency bond markets (LCBMs) is 
fundamentally defined by macroeconomic conditions and political 
credibility.43 Broader MDB efforts in the areas of governance and 
macroeconomic stabilisation are therefore complementary to initiatives 
for promoting LCBMs. 
The G20 has also taken steps towards promoting local currency markets 
by commissioning the development of a Common Diagnostic Framework 
(CDF) on local currency bond markets.44 However, follow-up on the CDF 
has been weak and not a policy priority of the G20. Hence, progress in 
this area has not been consistent and the topic needs revitalising within 
the G20. 
The MDBs have been advised to consider a range of other instruments. 
These include developing global markets of debt instruments funded by 
diaspora communities, such as diaspora bonds, and further developing 
output-based aid programs, with a view to increasing positive project 
spillovers to the community.45 A more progressive approach to 
incorporating suitable innovative financial instruments into mainstream 
MDB activity may ‘buy’ the MDBs some time to consider necessary 
adjustments to their mandate and governance structure. Recent 
experience with IMF reform has shown that even small changes in this 
area may take years to materialise. The global infrastructure gap, 
however, requires a strong and immediate response. Opportunities that 
are created by financial innovation may therefore be hard to ignore.  
 
ADDITIONALITY AND THE MDBS’ PROVISION OF 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Given the political difficulties in obtaining additional funding for financial 
assistance, the MDBs’ policy and technical assistance function may 
grow in importance. The case for policy and technical assistance is 
based on the assumption that improving the business and regulatory 
environment in assisted countries will indirectly foster stronger 
infrastructure investment. This line of argument is sound and should be 
further investigated. However, the MDBs’ technical assistance services 
also face a range of challenges. 
                                                          
43 World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015.” 
44 IMF et al., “Local Currency Bond Markets - a Diagnostic Framework,” (July 2013) 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financing-for-investment/Local-Currency-
Bond-Markets-Diagnostic-Framework-2013.pdf. 
45 Perry, Beyond Lending: How Multilateral Banks Can Help Developing Countries 
Manage Volatility; World Bank Group, “Financing for Development Post-2015”; 
Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
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First, there must be adequate recognition and accommodation by the 
MDBs of the local non-economic (chiefly social and environmental) 
dimensions of infrastructure. Infrastructure investment should not only 
target growth. It cannot necessarily be assumed that all members of the 
community will benefit equally – or even at all – from an infrastructure 
project without any dedicated effort to promote a broad sharing of the 
gains. The assumption of the existence of automatic ‘trickle down’ 
effects from major infrastructure projects has rightly been criticised by 
civil society.46 MDBs such as the World Bank are now acknowledging 
the limitations of this ‘trickle down’ view, and point to the importance of 
explicitly considering the impact of infrastructure on the poor.47 In 
addition to fostering economic growth, infrastructure investment should 
explicitly be designed to positively contribute to reducing inequality and 
promoting sustainability. At the very least, it should not be the source of, 
nor exacerbate, any undue negative impacts on communities and the 
environment. Moreover, there is no escaping the reality that people’s 
infrastructure needs differ according to socioeconomic characteristics 
(for example income and degree of urbanisation).48 The interests of 
marginalised groups thus need to be protected appropriately. The MDBs’ 
work is based on an array of standards that have been put in place to 
make sure that social and environmental impacts are carefully 
monitored. This area should be further strengthened and remain a core 
concern of broader MDB involvement in infrastructure investment. 
In addition, particular efforts will be required to address the implications 
of climate change on infrastructure investment. The time-inconsistency 
problem that is endemic to infrastructure in general is even more 
pronounced for investments in infrastructure that aim to take climate 
change into account and foster sustainability. The potential benefits of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation lie predominately in the future, 
but they are important. In addition to environmental and equity concerns, 
economic arguments (for example related to efficiency gains from 
technology-driven investment, market expansion and development, 
reduced extreme weather-related losses etc.) support the case for large-
scale investment in climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Globally, these upfront costs for addressing climate change are 
monumental. It is estimated that by 2020, USD 100-200 billion will be 
required annually in global mitigation investments to limit the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to 450ppm.49 
                                                          
46 Peter Bosshard, “Infrastructure for Whom? A Critique of the Infrastructure Strategies 
of the Group of 20 and the World Bank,” (Berkeley, May 2012) Available at: 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-
files/infrastructure_for_whom_report.pdf. 
47 World Bank Group, Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
48 Bosshard, “Infrastructure for Whom? A Critique of the Infrastructure Strategies of the 
Group of 20 and the World Bank.” 
49 Amar Bhattacharya, Mattia Romani, and Nicholas Stern, “Infrastructure for 
Development: Meeting the Challenge,” (Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
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Furthermore, adaptation will cost an additional USD 70-100 billion 
globally per year.50 While the MDBs’ contribution to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries should involve a 
financial assistance component, an even greater contribution may be in 
providing technical assistance in this area, in particular in relation to their 
infrastructure investment programs. The MDBs are active in both climate 
change and infrastructure financing. They are therefore well placed to 
combine their expertise in these two areas and provide guidance on 
sustainable infrastructure investment. 
The MDBs have recently made progress in accounting for the social and 
environmental dimensions of their engagement in infrastructure 
investment. The World Bank’s Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-
2015 specifically highlights the need to explore “co-benefits between 
infrastructure and environment [… and] inclusive development”.51 In 
addition, the World Bank commits to strengthen its ‘transformational 
engagement’ by increasing its efforts in the areas of knowledge 
management, cooperation with other actors, and pooling of expertise 
and resources.52 
 
CONCLUSION 
The MDBs can make a major contribution to reducing the global 
infrastructure gap, provided their actions begin with the principle of 
additionality. Lending should be concentrated on low- and lower middle-
income countries that lack other funding options. In terms of both 
financial and technical assistance, additionality needs to be 
strengthened. The MDBs can increase the productivity of their lending by 
further reinforcing recent efforts to more strongly embrace financial 
innovation. The MDBs’ technical assistance will benefit from a stronger 
integration between the infrastructure agenda and efforts to combat 
climate change and promote inclusive development. Given the 
enormous challenges in terms of infrastructure investment, in particular 
in developing countries, an efficient and effective MDB system is of 
utmost importance. The G20 can be instrumental in providing political 
impetus to this reform process, chiefly by aiming to strengthen the 
catalytic role of the MDBs in promoting productive and sustainable 
infrastructure investment. 
                                                                                                                             
Change and the Environment Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, June 
2012). 
50 Ibid. 
51 World Bank Group, Infrastructure Strategy Update FY2012-2015. 
52 Ibid. 
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LINKING DEVELOPMENT 
ACTIONS TO GROWTH: 
DEBATING INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
SUSAN HARRIS RIMMER1 
 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO DATE? 
My key recommendation from a previous Think20 paper focused on the 
status of development issues within G20 actions and debates, and their 
relationship to broader questions of accountability and the legitimacy of 
the G20 as a forum.2 Recommendation 1 reads: 
At least, do no harm. The Development Working Group should 
explicitly monitor the economic implications of G20 core actions 
in fiscal, financial, trade, exchange rate and environmental 
policies for non-G20 countries, especially low-income countries. 
 
This piece assesses how this recommendation is playing out in 2014 in 
relation to financing infrastructure investment, a key priority of Australia 
as G20 chair.3 
 
WHAT IS AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TO THE G20 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA? 
As the host nation for the 2014 G20 meeting, Australia has been explicit 
that focusing on development is fundamental to the G20’s growth 
mandate. Australia has sought to consider the impact of the G20 agenda 
as a whole on developing countries by linking development actions to 
growth. As the government’s overview of its priorities for the 2014 G20 
agenda notes, “[e]merging market and developing economies contribute 
around three quarters of global growth”.4 Prime Minister Abbott has 
                                                          
1 Director of Studies, Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australian National 
University. 
2 Susan Harris Rimmer, “Coherence and Humility: Development Priorities for the G20,” 
in G20 Monitor No. 5: Development and the G20 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013). Available at: 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/g20_monitor_the_g20_and_development_.pdf. 
3 Australian G20 Presidency, “Investment and Infrastructure,” 2014, Available at: 
https://www.g20.org/g20_priorities/g20_2014_agenda/investment_and_infrastructure. 
4 Ibid. 
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focused on the development aspects of trade, specifically “working 
together on practical actions to remove obstacles to trade and enhance 
countries’ ability to participate in global value chains through domestic 
reform”. Treasurer Joe Hockey has lauded the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting agenda as a way of increasing domestic budgets for 
developing and developed countries. So far, however, the political 
leaders have been muted in their public references to development 
issues. 
The challenge for the Brisbane Summit will be working out how best to 
identify and achieve practical actions to help developing countries, 
particularly low-income countries. This will involve working with these 
countries through outreach activities, and elevating certain issues that 
relate to development to the leaders’ level if that is strategically required. 
Australia has prioritised three development issues for the Development 
Working Group (DWG) to work on. The first is ‘creating conditions for 
developing countries to attract infrastructure investment’. The other two 
issues are strengthening tax systems, and improving access to financial 
services and the associated benefits from a reduction in the costs of 
transferring remittances home. 
 
CREATING CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES TO ATTRACT INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
The DWG will examine potential implications for LICs from the work of 
the former G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment, as well as 
strengthen coordination between the DWG and the new Infrastructure 
and Investment Working Group (IIWG), co-chaired by Germany, 
Indonesia and Mexico. Leaders in St Petersburg also endorsed the work 
plan prepared by the G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment and 
called for particular attention to be given to ways to improve public-
private partnership (PPP) arrangements.5 
The design/risk issues for investment in infrastructure for development 
outcomes is clearly an area of the development agenda that has the 
potential to be placed on the leadership track negotiations by Australia’s 
‘infrastructure prime minster’ Mr Tony Abbott. However, the issues 
around how to increase private investment are difficult to navigate, as 
shown by the recent G20 report Practical Solutions and Models for 
Addressing Obstacles to Institutional Investment in Infrastructure in 
Developing Countries.6 This debate comes in the context of more 
                                                          
5 G20, “G20 Workplan on Financing for Investment: Study Group's Findings and Ways 
Foward,” (St Petersburg: G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment, July 2013) 
Available at: http://en.g20russia.ru/news/20130906/782776427.html. 
6 World Bank Group Staff, “Practical Solutions and Models for Addressing Obstacles to 
Institutional Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries” (paper presented at 
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participation and consideration of the role and responsibilities of 
business in international development, as well as the dominance of 
economic diplomacy.7 
 
WHERE DOES THE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
FIT INTO THIS DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK? 
Is infrastructure investment in large part a development issue under this 
approach? Most development experts agree there is an underinvestment 
in pro-poor infrastructure globally, and certainly in G20 countries.8 The 
OECD estimates global infrastructure requirements to 2030 to be around 
USD 50 trillion.9 The International Energy Agency also estimated that 
adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change over the next 40 
years out to 2050 will require around USD 45 trillion or around USD 1 
trillion a year.10 
In some cases though, infrastructure that opens access to markets or 
social infrastructure can improve the lives of poor people. The 
consequences of a lack of investment fall most heavily on the poor, such 
as the almost 900 million people in the world who do not have access to 
clean, safe drinking water, or the 2.6 billion living without basic 
sanitation. The question is how to make such infrastructure investment 
and implementation truly pro-poor. Focusing on infrastructure investment 
for macroeconomic growth can, but does not automatically, benefit 
people living in extreme poverty, as they can be affected by 
displacement, environmental damage or by being forced to pay more for 
basic services.  
There is the larger issue too, of capital flowing ‘up-hill’ from emerging 
markets to developed economies, instead of “connecting the surplus 
savings of developed countries with the high social-return infrastructure 
investment opportunities in emerging markets”.11 Linked to this idea is 
                                                                                                                             
the Investment and Infrastructure Working Group, January 2014). Available at: 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/WBG%20IIWG%20Practica
l%20Solutions%20and%20Models%20Institutional%20Investors%20EMDEs.pdf. 
7 Margaret Callan and Robin Davies, “When Business Meets Aid: Analysing Public-
Private Partnerships for International Development,” (April 2013). 
8 Ifzal Ali and Ernesto M. Pernia, “Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction - What Is the 
Connection?,” ERD Policy Brief Series, no. 13 (2003). 
9 OECD, “The Role of Banks, Equity Markets and Institutional Investors in Long-Term 
Financing for Growth and Development: Report for G20 Leaders,” 15-16 February 2013, 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-
pensions/G20reportLTFinancingForGrowthRussianPresidency2013.pdf. 
10 Ibid. 
11 As examined by Daniela Strube and Stephen Grenville: G20 Studies Centre, G20 
Monitor No. 6: Tax, Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20, (Sydney, 2014) 
Available at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/tax-infrastructure-anti-corruption-
energy-and-g20.  
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the OECD’s urging of nations to promote ‘patient, productive and 
engaged’ capital when investing in infrastructure. 
 
WHAT MORE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE BRISBANE 
SUMMIT? 
Australia needs to use its outreach program to talk to LICs about the 
possible prioritisation of infrastructure investment within the G20 agenda. 
Australia also needs to open debates about the issue of public-private 
partnerships, as such partnerships raise significant concerns for many 
development, human rights and anti-corruption commentators. A key 
debate for Brisbane will be how to finance and handle issues of risk in a 
way that meets the developmental infrastructure needs of states and 
also safeguards vulnerable communities. One think tank report calls this 
a ‘responsible’ approach.12 The role of the multilateral development 
banks and the hard-won learning about the role of safeguards will be 
crucial to the success of this agenda. 
 
A report from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung on responsible investment in 
infrastructure asks:  
What kind of infrastructure is necessary and where? For whose 
benefit? How should the cost/benefits of infrastructure proposals 
be assessed? How will proposed infrastructure affect the 
planet’s carbon footprint? How can investment be brought into 
underserved countries, or continents, such as Africa? How 
should infrastructure finance be generated? Are PPPs the right 
modality for infrastructure development?13  
 
These seem like the right questions, and the best way to test them is to 
ask LICs and civil society about how to proceed in particular contexts, 
bearing in mind the ‘do no harm’ approach. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Nancy Alexander, “Responsible Investment in Infrastructure: Recommendations for 
the G20,” (Washington DC: Heinrich Böll Foundation North America, 2013) Available at: 
http://www.boell.org/downloads/Responsible_Investment_in_Infrastructure.pdf. 
13 Ibid. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS14 
 
• At least, do no harm. The Development Working Group should 
explicitly monitor the economic implications of G20 core actions in 
fiscal, financial, trade, exchange rate and environmental policies for 
non-G20 countries, especially low-income countries.  
• A development pillar/column should be added to the mutual 
assessment framework. 
•  The G20’s future lies in the ‘beyond aid’ agenda (trade facilitation, 
labour mobility, gender equality, climate finance, migration, 
technology etc.), and the aim should be policy coherence for 
development. 
• The greatest leadership challenge in 2013-2014 for all global 
governance actors is the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals and making sure something decent comes next. 
• Leaders declarations in St Petersburg, Brisbane and Istanbul need to 
speak to inclusive growth and acknowledge poverty and inequality 
challenges within the G20. 
• G20 is not a credible development actor without paying serious 
attention to gender equality issues. The new Development Action 
Plan and Mutual Assessment Plan must be informed by serious 
gender analysis and indicators. 
                                                          
14 These recommendations are taken from: Susan Harris Rimmer, “The G20 and Its 
Outreach: New Measures of Accountability, Legitimacy and Success,” in Think20 
Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike 
Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
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FAIR TAX FOR SHARED 
GROWTH: HOW TAX AND 
TRANSPARENCY REFORMS 
CAN HELP ACHIEVE G20 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 
CLAIRE SPOORS AND SERENA LILLYWHITE1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the poorest half of the world’s population owns less than the 
richest 85 people in the world, and inequality is growing, according to a 
recent Oxfam report. Working for the Few, which captured the zeitgeist 
at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, also showed that the 
gap between rich and poor is growing globally, and in all but four G20 
member countries.2 Since then, the International Monetary Fund, in two 
strongly worded reports, has identified inequality as a growing risk to the 
G20’s overarching objective for 2014 – economic growth.3 The Fund 
states: 
It would still be a mistake to focus on growth and let inequality 
take care of itself, not only because inequality may be ethically 
undesirable but also because the resulting growth may be low 
and unsustainable.4 
 
To achieve its goal of driving strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
across developed and developing economies, the G20 needs to note 
this growing trend and respond. Australia, the 2014 G20 President, 
                                                          
1 Claire Spoors and Serena Lillywhite jointly prepared this paper as representatives of 
Oxfam Australia and Publish What you Pay Australia. For more information on Oxfam 
Australia and Publish What You Pay Australia, visit www.oxfam.org.au and 
www.pwypaustralia.org. 
2 Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva and Nick Galasso, “Working for the Few: Political Capture and 
Economic Inequality,” (Oxford: Oxfam International, January 2014) Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-working-for-few-political-capture-
economic-inequality-200114-en.pdf. 
3 David Lipton, “Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality. Address to the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics,” (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 13 March 
2014). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/031314.htm. 
4 Jonathon D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, “IMF Discussion 
Note: Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” (Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund, 2014). Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf. 
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should particularly take note as our region is far from immune. On the 
contrary, a recent study from the Asian Development Bank should serve 
as a reminder that despite regional growth, these development 
challenges remain prevalent in the Asia Pacific region, such that in order 
to achieve regional development and growth targets, inequality must be 
addressed: 
For Asia and the Pacific, where stellar growth is being 
challenged by still pervasive poverty and rising inequality, 
inclusive growth must be more than just a highly desirable but 
rather vague goal: it is an imperative for achieving sustained 
and equitable growth.5 
 
A major contributor to increasing inequality is the broken international tax 
regime. The problem, in G20 parlance, is base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS). High levels of tax dodging by multinationals and wealthy 
individuals are draining away revenues from national budgets and 
creating a division between those who pay their taxes and those who 
have the means to avoid them. The Australian Government’s inclusion of 
international tax reform as a priority issue for its 2014 presidency of the 
G20 forum is welcome. Although the issue was first flagged at the 2009 
London Summit, it seems that it was not until budgets in industrialised 
economies reached breaking point that there has been a sufficient 
appetite to stop the haemorrhaging of tax revenue through clever 
accounting. Addressing tax avoidance, promoting international tax 
transparency and ensuring that developing countries benefit from the 
G20’s tax agenda, particularly in relation to information sharing, are the 
focus areas for this priority. 
Transparency is essential if tax avoidance, tax evasion and money 
laundering are going to be addressed, and to ensure developing 
countries benefit from international tax system reform. The 
interconnectedness of the world’s economies facilitates the 
circumvention of national tax jurisdictions by multinational companies. 
One of the most practical reforms to address this issue is to require 
business entities to disclose country-by-country information pertaining to 
their tax contributions. This will help ensure that companies pay their fair 
share of tax where value is created and real economic activities occur. In 
short, companies need to pay tax in the country where they conduct their 
business. Anything less than this will deprive developing and 
industrialised countries alike of much needed tax revenue. 
In purely financial terms, some multinationals feel it makes good 
business sense to minimise their tax bill. This is done by artificially 
transferring profits to shell companies in secrecy jurisdictions with low or 
                                                          
5 ADB, “Adb’s Support for Inclusive Growth,” (Manila: ADB, March 2014) Available at: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/TES-IG_0.pdf. 
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nominal tax rates, where companies are neither resident nor conduct 
business. Yet the erosion of tax bases, which provide the infrastructure 
and labour skills that multinationals rely on, is not sustainable for the 
corporate sector or for society – G20 governments, Oxfam and the 
International Monetary Fund agree on this point. It is also unfair on small 
businesses and ordinary citizens who pay their dues and increasingly 
shoulder the tax burden.  
The OECD has found that on average multinationals pay 5 per cent in 
corporate tax while small companies pay around 30 per cent.6 This non-
productive competitive advantage that multinationals gain over small 
companies by dodging their tax liabilities distorts the market. 
 
IMPACT OF BEPS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Tax avoidance by digital brands in developed countries has recently 
captured global headlines. However, the shifting of profits by 
multinational companies out of developing and least developed countries 
is even more pernicious, and is a prominent factor undermining 
prospects for stable global economic growth.7 The OECD states that, 
“[m]ultinational enterprises (MNEs) are being accused of dodging taxes 
worldwide and in particular in developing countries, where tax revenue is 
critical to foster long-term development”.8 
When profit shifting is combined with other illicit financial flows, such as 
the looting of public assets, the impact is devastating. In 2011, the 
revenue lost to developing countries was valued at just under USD 1 
trillion.9 Approximately half of these illicit flows from developing countries 
are attributable to profit shifting by multinationals.10 This represents a 
loss of tax revenues of around USD 100 billion,11 which could have paid 
                                                          
6 OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” (Paris, 12 February 2013). 
7 Petr Janský and Alex Prats, “Multinational Coroporations and the Profit-Shifting Lure 
of Tax Havens,” (March 2012) Available at: http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/ca-op-
9-multinational-corporations-tax-havens-march-2013.pdf; Clemens Fuest and Nadine 
Riedel, “Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance in Developing Countries: The Role of 
International Profit Shifting” (paper presented at the The Dynamics of Illicit Flows from 
Developing Countries conference, Washington DC, 2009). Available at: 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Workin
g_Papers/Series_10/WP1012.pdf.  
8 “Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance in Developing Countries: The Role of International 
Profit Shifting.” 
9 Dev Kar and Devon Cartwright-Smith, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing 
Countries: 2002-2006,” (Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity, April 2009) 
Available at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-
%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf. 
10 Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the 
Free-Market System (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2005). 
11 Ann Hollingshead, “The Implied Tax Revenue Loss from Trade Mispricing,” 
(Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2010) Available at: 
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for the provision of basic school education in poor countries four times 
over.12 The impact of this lost revenue is compounded by the fact that 
developing countries are more reliant on corporate tax than developed 
countries that can tap other tax sources such as personal income tax.13 
A large number of developing countries are reliant, sometimes solely, on 
the extractives sector for revenue. This is particularly true in sub-
Saharan Africa, where in 2011 exports of oil, gas and minerals were 
worth USD 382 billion, nearly eight times the value of international aid to 
the continent.14 Unfortunately, many resource-rich developing countries 
remain trapped in poverty and do not benefit from their natural resource 
wealth. The secrecy and corruption that often surround deals facilitates 
profit shifting and illicit financial flows. This paradox, known as the 
‘resource curse’, sees two-thirds of the world’s poorest people living in 
resource-rich countries. 
An alleged example of this is the case of the mining and commodities 
conglomerate, Glencore (now GlencoreXstrata) and its dealings in 
Zambia. According to a leaked Grant Thornton audit report, Glencore 
engaged in profit shifting when selling copper from its Mopani mine to 
Switzerland at below market prices.15 The report also found that the 
company had artificially increased its costs, which meant Glencore was 
able to report overall losses and pay minimal or no corporation tax in 
Zambia, a country where almost two-thirds of the population live below 
the poverty line.16 
If a country like Zambia cannot harness its finite natural resource wealth 
(as well as revenues from other major sectors such as agriculture), its 
prospects for the development of a healthy, skilled and productive 
population, and the economic flow-on effects from such development, 
are greatly diminished. The status quo, which sees the country remain 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/implied%20tax%20revenue%2
0loss%20report_final.pdf. 
12 UNESCO, “Schooling for Millions of Children Jeopardized by Reductions in Aid,” 
(Paris, June 2013) Available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002211/221129E.pdf?utm_source=News+Alert
+10%2F6%2F13+-
+New+figures+on+children+out+of+school+and+aid+to+education&utm_campaign=Ne
ws+Alert+June+2013&utm_medium=email. 
13 Sizeable tax contributors, such as foreign companies, across sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, typically constitute less than 5 per cent of all taxpayers, yet generally 
contribute three-quarters of all tax revenue, see: International Tax Dialogue, “Revenue 
Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (2010) Available at: 
http://www.itdweb.org/documents/AfricaStudy.pdf. 
14 See the WTO Statistics Database: stat.wto.org and OECD Stat Extracts: 
stats.oecd.org 
15 Grant Thornton and ECON Pöyry, “Pilot Audit Report – Mopani Copper Mines PLC,” 
(2010) Available at: 
http://www.letemps.ch/rw/Le_Temps/Quotidien/2011/02/09/Economie/ImagesWeb/Audit
%20Glencore%20Mopani.pdf. 
16 World Bank, “Data: Zambia,” 2014, Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/zambia. 
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dependent on aid, is clearly not the optimum outcome, not least as 
stretched budgets in donor countries mean aid budgets are shrinking. It 
certainly does not fit with the G20’s objective of delivering strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth across developed and developing 
economies.  
Clearly it would be preferable for developing countries to mobilise and 
manage their resource revenues effectively to achieve sustainable 
growth. This would enable current aid commitments to deliver broader 
benefits beyond supplementing missing tax revenues. The governments 
of industrialised countries with big resource sectors, such as Australia, 
must play an active leadership role. Advanced economies need to 
ensure the multinationals headquartered in their countries are not 
engaged in tax avoidance, tax evasion or corruption, particularly in 
developing countries. 
 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY 
In response to this challenge, the United States and European Union 
have introduced legislation that requires oil, gas and mining companies 
to publish what they pay governments in the countries where they 
operate, at both a country and project level. These jurisdictions cover 
two-thirds of the global extractive industry market. If the other G20 
nations with large extractive markets followed their lead and introduced 
similar legislation, a truly global standard for extractive industry 
transparency would emerge. 
The Africa Progress Panel (chaired by former United Nations Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan and which includes Michel Camdessus, former 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and Robert Rubin, 
former Secretary of the United States Treasury) argues that 
transparency in the extractives sector is essential to ensure resource-
rich countries harness their natural wealth for development. In its Africa 
Progress Report 2013, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa's Natural 
Resources for All, the Panel’s number one recommendation states that: 
All countries should embrace and enforce the project-by-project 
disclosure standards embodied in the US Dodd-Frank Act and 
comparable EU legislation, applying them to all extractive 
industry companies listed on their stock exchanges. It is vital 
that Australia, Canada and China, as major players in Africa, 
actively support the emerging global consensus on disclosure. It 
is time to go beyond the current patchwork of initiatives to a 
global common standard.17 
                                                          
17 Africa Progress Panel, “Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa's Natural Resources 
for All,” (2013). 
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Since publication of the Panel’s report, the Canadian Government has 
committed to establish a mandatory reporting standard for extractive 
companies by April 2015.18 This will be consistent with the legislation in 
the United States and European Union. The decision is endorsed by the 
country’s mining industry. It should also be noted that since 2010, the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange has required prospective oil, gas and 
mining companies to disclose payments to governments in their listing 
applications.  
The benefits of a global common standard for extractive industry 
transparency would help: 
• Ensure extractive companies’ activities lead to sustainable economic 
development in resource-rich countries by enabling citizens to hold 
their governments to account for the collection and spending of 
revenues 
• Offset aid dependency in resource-rich countries and address 
fundamental causes of poverty and inequality 
• Combat corruption in resource-rich countries and foster more stable 
operating environments for companies 
• Reduce the reporting burden on companies that are listed on markets 
in multiple jurisdictions 
• Ensure a level playing field for all extractive companies issuing 
shares on international markets 
• Assist investors with risk assessment when making decisions to 
invest in extractive projects. 
 
Further, major players in the extractives sector see a fundamental 
benefit of payment transparency in helping establish and maintain social 
license with the local communities where they operate. Without this, 
companies risk significant losses due to project delays, project 
shutdowns, damage to assets, and in the worst-case scenario, human 
rights violations and loss of life.  
Companies such as Statoil and Tullow Oil,19 those represented by the 
Mining Association of Canada and the Prospectors & Developers 
Association of Canada (which worked with civil society to develop a 
                                                          
18 Natural Resources Canada, “Minister Oliver Reinforces Harper Government's 
Support for the Mining Industry,” 3 March 2014, Available at: www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-
room/news-release/2014/15563. 
19 Statoil, “2013 Sustainability Report,” (2014) Available at: 
http://www.statoil.com/no/InvestorCentre/AnnualReport/AnnualReport2013/Documents/
DownloadCentreFiles/01_KeyDownloads/SustainabilityReport.pdf; Tullow Oil PLC, 
“Tullow Oil PLC 2013 Annual Report & Accounts,” (2014).  
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framework for disclosure),20 and B20 members, Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton, have called for the harmonisation of payment disclosure 
requirements across markets.21 In its recent Taxes Paid report Rio Tinto 
stated that “governments should work together to adopt a consistent 
global approach” with regards to mandatory disclosure.22 
International investors with USD 5.8 trillion in assets under management 
and investors in Australia with over AUD 2 trillion in assets under 
management also support harmonisation.23 Investors recognise that it 
will enable them to compare and evaluate extractive companies, using 
the same type and level of information, across global markets. Due to 
cross listing, a number of companies listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX), worth over AUD 300 billion in market capitalisation, will 
be required to disclose either under the United States, European Union 
or forthcoming Canadian legislation. If Australia does not keep up, there 
will be an asymmetry with regards to information disclosed by ASX 
extractive industry issuers.24 
Australia, as a major global extractive industry player and also President 
of the G20 for 2014, is presented with the perfect opportunity to progress 
the global movement towards greater harmonisation and the 
development of a global standard. Extractive industry transparency is 
already on the agenda of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and 
                                                          
20 Publish What You Pay Canada et al., “Recommendations on Mandatory Disclosure 
of Payments from Canadian Mining Companies to Governments,” (16 January 2014) 
Available at: 
http://www.pwyp.ca/images/M_images/Working_Group_Transparency_Recommendatio
ns_Eng.pdf. 
21 Sam Walsh, “Rio Tinto Spoke at the Closing Plenary of the Pre-G8 Summit on Trade 
Tax and Transparency, Lancaster House, London,” 15 June 2013, Available at: 
http://www.riotinto.com/documents/G8_event_Closing_plenary-
Sam_Walsh_Rio_Tinto.pdf; Graham Kerr, “Letter from BHP Billiton Group CFO Graham 
Kerr to Mary Jo White, Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission,” 15 October 
2013, Available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction-
issuers/resourceextractionissuers-13.pdf.  
22 Rio Tinto, “Taxes Paid in 2013: A Report on the Economic Contribution Made by Rio 
Tinto to Public Finances,” (March 2014) Available at: 
http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_taxes_paid_in_2013.pdf. 
23 Jacob de Wit, Steve Waygood, and Matthias Beer, “Investor Letter to the Diretor 
General of Natural Resources Canada,” 14 August 2013, Available at: 
http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/NRCan%20Joint%20Investor%20Letter
%20-%208-14-2013.PDF; Ann Byrne, “Letter from Ann Byrne, CEO of the Australian 
Council of Super Investors, to the Regulatory and Public Policy Department at the 
Australian Stock Exchange Limited,” 27 January 2012, Available at: 
http://www.acsi.org.au/images/stories/subs_pres__speeches/12%20Submission%20to
%20ASX%20Listing%20Rules%20Review%20Paper.pdf; Martin Codina, “Australian 
Implentantion of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: A Letter from Martin 
Codina, Director of Policy at the Financial Services Council to Diane Lewis, Head of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council Secretariat,” 29 September 2011, Available at: 
http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/file/SubmissionsFile/2011_0928_LettertoAustSecuritie
sExchangereAustralianImplementationofExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInititive.pdf. 
24 Publish What You Pay Australia, “Australia: An Unlevel Playing Field: Extractive 
Transparency on the ASX 200,” (May 2013) Available at: 
http://publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/publishwhatyoupay.org/files/ASX.pdf. 
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there is clear crossover with the mandates of the Development Working 
Group and the Finance Track with respect to domestic resource 
mobilisation, facilitating investment and tax reform.25 
THE OECD PLAN 
The G20-endorsed tax reform effort, overseen by the Finance Track, is 
led by the OECD via its 15-point Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting. The Action Plan contains important elements for fixing the 
broken tax system so it is fit for purpose. However, it is regrettable that 
developing countries were not involved in developing the plan from the 
outset, and as such, have not been meaningfully engaged in the 
process. 
The lack of capacity within developing country tax authorities is a key 
barrier to ensuring developing countries benefit from the outcomes of the 
BEPS project and the parallel discussion on automatic exchange of tax 
information. To illustrate this point, it has been calculated that more than 
650,000 additional tax officials would need to be employed in sub-
Saharan African countries for the region to have the same tax officials to 
population ratio as the OECD average.26  
The OECD’s mandate to establish requirements for multinationals to 
disclose key financial information on their activities, profits and taxes 
paid, seems limited thus far to information to be submitted to tax 
authorities. However, public disclosure of information pertaining to 
multinational entities (not individuals) – country-by-country breakdown of 
number of employees, physical assets, sales, profits and taxes due and 
paid – is likely to have a greater impact on tackling base erosion and 
profit shifting and at a lower cost. This level of transparency would assist 
developing countries where tax authorities’ capacity is lacking. 
The primary benefit of country-by-country reporting is the deterrent effect 
it would have on multinationals to pursue aggressive profit shifting and 
tax avoidance schemes. It would help restore the reputations of 
                                                          
25 The voluntary Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (the EITI), which is often 
confused with mandatory disclosure, also forms part of the discussion in the Anti-
Corruption Working Group with regards to the extractives sector. Clare Short, the Chair 
of the EITI and former UK minister, along with the Publish What You Pay international 
civil society network, views the two mechanisms as complementary measures, as 
mandatory disclosure will lead to the provision of timely and easily comparable data that 
can be utilised by the multi-stakeholder groups that oversee the EITI process. It will also 
apply to those countries that currently lack the political will to implement the initiative. 
The United States, British, French and Italian governments have committed to 
implementing the EITI in addition to introducing mandatory disclosure requirements for 
extractive companies. For more, see: EITI, “Clare Short: Disclosure Requirements 
Complement Eiti,” 21 August 2012, Available at: http://eiti.org/news-events/clare-short-
disclosure-requirements-complement-eiti#. 
26 Claire Kumar, “Africa Rising? Inequalities and the Essential Role of Fair Taxation,” 
(Christian Aid and the Tax Justice Network Africa, February 2014) Available at: 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Africa-tax-and-inequality-report-Feb2014.pdf. 
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companies at the centre of recent tax dodging scandals and assist 
investors with risk assessment. Beyond enhanced corporate 
accountability, an additional benefit of this level of disclosure is greater 
government accountability for the use of tax revenues for essential 
services. 
This type of disclosure would complement the United States’ and 
European Union’s requirements for extractive industry transparency, 
which are limited to countries of operation and not countries where 
companies have legal entities for the purpose of avoiding tax. 
To crack down on broader illicit financial flows, public registers of the 
beneficial owners behind corporate structures is urgently needed. 
Without this, untaxed profits and other illicit finances will continue to be 
moved ‘offshore’. The British Government has made a commitment to 
establish such registers for companies and in March 2014, members of 
the European Parliament voted in support of the creation of public 
registries of beneficial owners for companies, trusts and other corporate 
entities.27 Cost/benefit analyses for the United Kingdom and European 
Union have shown that such registries are cost effective and would 
assist with law enforcement, asset recovery and financial sector due 
diligence requirements.28 
 
CONCLUSION 
Australia, as the G20 President this year, has a responsibility to drive the 
reforms that will deliver the well-functioning domestic and international 
tax systems that are integral to strengthening industrialised economies. 
But these reforms are also critical to achieving sustainable economic 
and human development in developing and least developed countries. 
The G20 presidency is a rare and time-bound opportunity to influence 
the process guiding these reforms to ensure they help address poverty 
and inequality globally and within Asia and the Pacific where, despite 
high growth, 790 million people live on less than USD 1.25 a day and 1.6 
billion on less than USD 2 a day.29 
Transparency of taxes and other payments to governments will help 
ensure domestic resources, essential for securing access to universal 
                                                          
27 Innovation & Skills Department for Business and The Prime Minister's Office, “Public 
Register to Boost Company Transparency,” 31 October 2013, Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/public-register-to-boost-company-transparency; 
European Parliament, “Parliament toughens up anti-money laundering rules,” 11 March 
2014, Available at www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20140307IPR38110/html/Parliament-toughens-up-anti-money-laundering-
rules. 
28 John Howell and Co Ltd, “Costs of beneficial ownership declarations,” April 2013, 
Available at: www.globalwitness.org/howell. 
29 ADB, “ADB’s Support for Inclusive Growth.” 
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services for all citizens, are retained and mobilised in the countries 
where the wealth is generated. It will help reduce inequality, reduce 
dependency on aid donors and achieve stronger, better-balanced and 
more sustainable economic growth.  
In particular, Australia needs to harness its influence as a global mining 
power, and its desire as G20 President to draw out synergies across the 
G20 agenda, to boost international momentum toward a global standard 
for transparency in the extractives sector.  
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE G20 
• Ensure that all developing countries participate in the OECD-led 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting process on an equal footing, and are 
supported in implementing measures to stem their losses from 
international tax avoidance and illicit financial flows that deprive 
governments of badly needed revenues. 
• Promote worldwide tax transparency (public country-by-country 
reporting) by requiring multinational enterprises to publish for each 
country in which they operate: a breakdown of their employees, 
physical assets, sales, profits and taxes due and paid so as to assess 
whether they pay their fair share of taxes. 
• Support the development of a global transparency standard for the 
extractive industries and adopt legislation that requires oil, gas and 
mining companies to publish payments made to governments on a 
country-by-country and project-by-project basis, consistent with 
United States and European Union legislation. 
• Implement a multilateral system for exchanging tax information on an 
automatic basis, which would include developing countries from the 
start with non-reciprocal commitments (no obligation to send 
information until they have the capacity to do so). 
• Adopt national public registries of owners of companies, trusts and 
foundations to reveal who is the ultimate owner of these assets and 
to tackle tax avoidance, tax evasion and illicit financial flows. 
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THE G20 AND THE GLOBAL 
ENERGY GOVERNANCE GAP: 
A CASE FOR LEADERS 
HUGH JORGENSEN1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern societies depend upon power sockets and petrol pumps to 
function. As such, a concern of all countries is to have secure and stable 
access to energy supplies. In addition, overcoming ‘energy poverty’ is 
central to promoting economic development and reducing poverty. 
Energy markets are, however, not always efficient and domestic 
priorities often mean that international externalities exist. This is clearly 
evident in the contribution that major emitter energy policies are making 
to climate change. International cooperation is required if: nations are to 
have secure access to reliable sources of energy; the world’s poor are to 
have access to modern forms of energy; and the impact of increased 
energy consumption on ecosystems and the climate is to be minimised. 
But the framework for such international cooperation is seriously lacking. 
The ‘global energy governance system’ in 2014 is fragmented, 
byzantine, inflexible to new energy problems and does not adequately 
bring together the needs of major emerging markets and the OECD 
countries.  
Furthermore, with 1.3 billion people in the world currently lacking access 
to electricity, 2.6 billion people still reliant on burning traditional biomass 
for cooking, a projected global population increase from 7 billion to 8.7 
billion between 2012-2035, and the encroaching risk of greenhouse gas 
emission-induced climate change, the current global energy governance 
system leaves much to be desired.2 To paraphrase an anonymous 
Gaelic policy-maker: if the goal is to achieve sensible and responsive 
global energy governance for all, then “you would not start from here”. 
Yet getting from ‘here’ to an energy governance framework fit for the 
twenty-first century will only happen if world leaders from major energy 
producer and consumer countries can reach a common understanding 
on why such an outcome is politically desirable, how their citizens would 
benefit, and what they can actually do to assist. This is an issue that 
should be addressed by the G20 if it truly is the pre-eminent forum for 
                                                          
1 Research Associate, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013, (Paris, 2013); IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers. 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” 2013, 
Available at: http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-
SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf. 
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international economic cooperation. In broad strokes, this paper outlines 
a political case for reforming global energy governance.  
Evidently, the politics of energy varies widely from country to country and 
is heavily influenced by each country’s ability to access energy import or 
export markets. As such, although much has been written on which key 
global energy governance institutions are in need of an update and why 
– and this paper does address the need for modernisation of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) – this paper’s main objective is to 
synthesise why multilateral energy governance is a problem in particular 
need of political attention from domestically elected leaders.3 In outlining 
the complex and emergent challenges inherent within the current ‘global 
energy matrix’, the paper then proceeds to argue that from the 
perspective of both leaders and their citizens, a more coherent system is 
a desirable global public good worthy of pursuit. The final section briefly 
considers the role of ‘leader to leader’ cooperation as a catalyst of 
institutional reform, and how this might be practically applied to the world 
of energy governance. 
 
WHICH CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE GAPS REQUIRE ATTENTION? 
On a day-to-day basis, the majority of citizens are realistically less 
concerned with where power is sourced from, so much as they are with 
whether something happens when they hit the ‘on switch’ or turn the 
ignition key. As such, a simple way to approach the question of ‘which 
energy governance gaps are most in need of multilateral attention?’ is to 
begin with an acknowledgment of how human beings actually use 
energy resources at the final point of consumption, and how this usage 
is dependent upon cross-border arrangements. Telecommunications, 
manufacturing, driving, heating and cooking are just a handful of 
practices that are affected by, or reliant upon, energy commodities that 
exist within a global market. By extension, the purview of policy-makers 
is to meet their citizens’ daily demands for access to a secure, cost-
effective and relatively price-stable supply of energy for the purpose of 
facilitating activity in the commercial, industrial, transportation and 
residential sectors.4 Of note, ‘cost-effective’ does not necessarily mean 
‘cheapest’ – depending upon the degree of domestic political concern, 
‘cost-effective’ also captures energy policies that have factored in some 
or all of the cost of negative externalities like long-term environmental 
                                                          
3 For comprehensive overviews of contemporary global energy governance issues, see 
the papers contained within the September 2011 ‘special issue’ of Global Policy: Global 
Energy Governance, and also Thijs Van de Graaf, The Politics and Institutions of Global 
Energy Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
4 US Energy Information Administration, “How Much Energy Is Consumed in the World 
by Each Sector?,” 20 November 2013, Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=447&t=1. 
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degradation, and pollution that diminishes the overall quality of life and 
health of citizens. 
However, although societies gain from sound energy policies, more 
energy governance does not automatically equate with better 
governance. Any investigation that aims to improve the global energy 
governance system must carefully define those cross-border policy 
problems which no process or institution has an adequate mandate to 
engage with – or even any mandate at all. Even then, the demarcation of 
an energy governance gap does not automatically necessitate a 
multilateral response, as there may be alternative and more effective 
unilateral or bilateral ways of minimising the risks associated with that 
gap. Energy policy, both domestic and multilateral, is ultimately useful 
insofar as it actually facilitates beneficial social and economic activity. 
The goal should be to prioritise work on policy blind spots where political 
leaders can act in concert to add genuine value. If policy-makers 
respond positively to one of the following questions, then they should 
have an incentive to engage with strengthening multilateral energy 
governance:  
 
• Are the energy or foreign policies of foreign states impeding, or have 
the potential to interrupt, domestic supply and access to global 
energy markets?  
• Are the energy policies of foreign countries producing negative 
environmental externalities for the domestic population?  
• Is negotiation with one or more countries on energy policy necessary 
for the prevention or minimisation of further detrimental outcomes?  
 
On all three questions, multilateral energy institutions can add value – in 
providing technical support, a venue, and a general framework for 
conducting negotiations about resolving or preventing, current and future 
cross-border energy dilemmas. Multilateral bodies like the IEA and the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) already play an 
important role in assisting policy-makers to think strategically about how 
the medium- and long-term outlook for domestic and international energy 
markets will affect their ability to meet their citizens’ daily expectations. 
Indeed, before looking specifically at how multilateral energy governance 
itself can be strengthened, it is worth outlining several major challenges 
that would benefit from enhanced international cooperation.  
Perhaps the most unsurprising of the IEA’s projections is the forecast 
increase in population-fuelled energy consumption that is already 
underway in non-OECD countries. The IEA predicts that non-OECD 
countries will account for over 90 per cent of the growth in energy 
demand between 2011-2035, chiefly driven by changing economic and 
…more energy  
governance does not 
automatically equate with 
better governance. 
…major oil and gas 
importers are on track to 
become exporters, major 
exporters are anticipated 
to consume more, and 
many smaller players will 
further disrupt energy 
supply and demand 
channels as their market 
influence grows over 
time. 
 INFRASTRUCTURE, TAX, ENERGY 
 
47
 
demographic circumstances.5 Graph 1 and Table 1 below highlight the 
transformative impact this growth in energy consumption from non-
OECD countries will have on the global energy system: major oil and 
gas importers are on track to become exporters, major exporters are 
anticipated to consume more, and many smaller players will further 
disrupt energy supply and demand channels as their market influence 
grows over time.6 For prominent energy governance actors like the IEA 
and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
originally composed of the world’s major oil importers and exporters 
respectively, their mandates and membership are becoming increasingly 
misaligned with the nature of actual global energy challenges.  
Graph 17: Net oil and gas import/export shares in selected regions under the IEA’s New Policies Scenario 
 
                                                          
5 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013. 
6 Graph 1 is taken from is taken from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2013. Table 1 is 
also derived from data contained within the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2013, however, 
unless specified, the data has been converted into standard exajoules. 
7 Note from page 77 of IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013: “Import shares for each fuel 
are calculated as net imports divided by primary demand. Export shares are calculated 
as net exports divided by production. A negative number indicates net exports. 
Southeast Asia, i.e. the ASEAN region, includes Indonesia.” 
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Table 1: Global primary energy demand and energy related CO2 emissions under the IEA’s three different policy 
scenarios 
 
* includes traditional and modern biomass uses 
** excludes international bunkers 
 
Although the rise of the non-OECD energy consumers is chiefly being 
driven by major emerging economies like China and India, the energy 
footprint of Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern economies will also 
expand. China’s total electricity capacity doubled between 2005 and 
2010, and in December 2013, China officially replaced the United States 
as the world’s largest net importer of oil, ending a reign stretching back 
to the 1970s.8 Between 2011-2025, China will account for 37 per cent of 
the growth in energy demand, and 18 per cent between 2025-2035, 
while India will account for 14 per cent, and 26 per cent respectively. 
Indeed, India will replace China as the world’s largest coal importer by 
around 2020. Meanwhile, the Middle East will be the second largest gas 
consumer by 2020, and will replace Europe as the third largest ‘bloc’ 
consumer of oil by 2035 (China and the United States split first and 
second place).9 Conversely, by 2030 sub-Saharan Africa, sadly, is 
projected to see an increase in the number of people without access to 
modern energy services from 600 to 645 million, which will 
approximately constitute two-thirds of everyone in the world without 
                                                          
8 Ed Crooks and Lucy Hornby, “The New Gas Guzzler: China Has Overtaken the Us as 
the World's Top Oil Importer,” Financial Times, 9 October 2013; Daniel Yergin, The 
Quest (New York: Penguin Books, 2013). 
9 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013. 
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access to an electricity grid.10 Clearly, maximising the social and political 
gains from these shifts in global energy consumption will depend upon 
advanced policy planning, as the expansion of already existing networks 
of energy production and distribution will require new capital-intensive 
projects that typically involve long lead-in times, and a semblance of 
future regulatory certainty.11 
Other emergent factors and risks that threaten to undermine existing 
modes of energy governance include changing patterns of 
industrialisation, power generation and distribution; volatility of energy 
pricing; as well as disruptive technological innovation within the energy 
sector, as typified by the falling cost of renewable power generation 
technologies,12 and the new means of tapping previously inaccessible 
shale, coal seam and tight gas (hydraulic fracturing – colloquially known 
as ‘fracking’).13 For example, the forecast rise of non-OECD countries as 
major energy players is all the more remarkable in light of the most 
recent – and optimistic – projections from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) that suggests new drilling techniques might mean 
net oil imports to the United States could fall to zero by as early as 
2037.14  
However, while demographic and technological developments will have 
significant ramifications for the combination of resources that constitute 
the global energy supply, the most ‘diabolical’ cross-border policy 
challenge calling out for improved multilateral energy governance is 
climate change. Climate change evokes dilemmas associated with both 
free-rider and ‘tragedy of the commons’ problems – chiefly in terms of 
the lack of accountability individual countries face for producing harmful 
greenhouse gases that diminish the quality of life within other 
jurisdictions.  
Yet if policy-makers accept the need to counter the high probability risk 
that climate change poses to the planet’s liveability, as strongly advised 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5), then a major decarbonisation of energy 
production is required, as is preparation for the social and economic 
changes that such a shift would necessitate. How well political leaders 
are able to cooperate on balancing the liveability of the planet with 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 Van de Graaf, The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance. 
12 IRENA Secretariat, “Renewable Power Generaiton Costs in 2012: An Overview,” 
(Bonn: IRENA, 2012) Available at: 
http://costing.irena.org/media/2769/Overview_Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-
2012.pdf. 
13 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013. 
14 The EIA notes this is under the most optimistic, and therefore not the most likely, 
scenario. See: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
with Projections to 2040,” (April 2014) Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf. 
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meeting the energy demands of their citizens will thus have a formative 
influence on future energy policies.  
The IEA paints three scenarios that are broadly based around differing 
combinations of policy preferences with regards to sustainable energy. 
Specifically, the scenarios point to the variety of ways in which carbon 
emissions will likely be affected by the policy incentives politicians put in 
place for the usage of fossil fuels, renewables, nuclear and other 
alternatives. The exajoules expended per year under each of the three 
scenarios, projected out to 2035, as well as the total amount of CO2 
emissions in gigatonnes, are listed above in Table 1.  
Factoring in global population growth, the IEA’s 2013 energy outlook 
finds that if current energy policies are left untouched between 2011-
2035, fossil fuel sources (coal, oil and gas) will still account for around 80 
per cent of global energy production, equating to an absolute increase in 
yearly fossil fuel usage from 450 to 620 exajoules. Evidently, ‘business 
as usual’ policies will, unsurprisingly, probably result in a similar 
proportional breakdown of energy production to the present, albeit with 
greater absolute demand for every resource. Alternatively, if the major 
emitters opt for the tentative and mild emission-reducing policies touted 
under the IEA’s ‘new policies scenario’, then we can anticipate a slight 
decline in fossil fuels as an energy input, driven by a decline in market 
share for coal of around four points, as well as an increased role for 
renewables. This would see an increase in annual energy-related CO2 
emissions of 20 per cent over 2011 levels (37.2 Gt over 31. Gt per year), 
versus the 40 per cent rise projected under ‘current policies’ (to 43.1 Gt 
per year). However, the ‘new policies’ scenario will still see global 
demand for yearly energy resources increasing by an additional 40 
exajoules, with demand for oil increasing by 13 per cent, coal by 17 per 
cent, natural gas by 48 per cent, nuclear by 66 per cent, and renewables 
by 77 per cent. The third IEA projection is the ‘450 scenario’, where 
governments actually implement the necessary policies to give the 
planet at least a 50 per cent chance of limiting the global temperature 
increase to no more than 2 degrees celsius by 2100.15  
Regardless of which scenario proves most accurate, policy-makers will 
have to prepare for a substantial transformation in global energy 
markets, and have the flexibility to accommodate unexpected deviations 
from these projected trends and any associated impact in their own 
jurisdiction. Countries that produce or rely on any one of the resources 
listed above, and that are adequately prepared for an expansion or 
reduction in output or consumption of those resources, will be less 
                                                          
15 The 450 figure refers to the implicit need to have the concentration of greenhouse 
gases stabilising at 450 parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere by 2100, see: IEA, 
World Energy Outlook 2013. It is worth noting that under IRENA’s projections, 
renewable energy is forecast to play a larger role in the energy mix, even under its own 
version of the ‘current policies’ scenario, see: IRENA Secretariat, “Renewable Power 
Generaiton Costs in 2012: An Overview.” 
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susceptible to market shocks than those that resign themselves to more 
reactive short-term policies. More broadly, the risk of shocks to the 
supply and demand of energy markets, new (gas) and old (oil), be they 
gluts or shortages, must also be taken into account, so that policy-
makers can establish prevention plans, or at least minimise the fallout, 
from any shocks to energy access. Recent tensions between Russia and 
Ukraine point to the growing importance of effective governance within 
the field of gas market supply. 
 
STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE – WHAT’S IN IT FOR LEADERS? 
Global governance exists where the policy preferences of individual 
states overlap, and an agreement can be reached on how to 
cooperatively pursue these ‘overlapping’ shared objectives. Needless to 
say, as the preferences that states bring into the global energy 
governance sphere are born at the domestic political economy level, 
finding such common objectives is not easy. This is not least because 
the position of each state varies widely according to the relative power 
balance between politicians, industry lobby groups and other 
stakeholders, as well as other factors like population, geographical 
location and geological endowment.16 Moreover, as the previous section 
outlined, the major multilateral energy bodies are no longer as neatly 
composed of ‘importers’ or ‘exporters’ as they were at the time of their 
creation. Thus, with members of the IEA transitioning to the status of 
energy ‘exporter’, OPEC countries playing a much larger role as energy 
consumers, and the emergence of major emerging economies that are 
not fully-fledged members of either, there is a growing incentive for 
states to distil the increasingly outdated network of institutions that make 
up the current global energy governance system into a system that is 
better aligned with the energy challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Specifically, in order to minimise the risk of market disruption due to 
misinformation, the major energy players have a strong incentive to 
devise an institution that, at a minimum, allows for continual dialogue 
and negotiation around shared future energy dilemmas, as well as the 
mutual dissemination of domestic information and data. It is an 
anachronism that no policy-making agency currently brings together all 
of the major or future energy players within the one room, on an equal 
basis, for the specific purpose of strengthening cooperation on energy. 
Although there are many more objectives that deserve multilateral 
attention, bringing together all major energy players should be an 
obvious starting point.  
                                                          
16 Van de Graaf, The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance. 
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On face value, the membership of the International Energy Forum (IEF), 
which brings together 87 countries that “account for around 90 per cent 
of world oil and gas supply and demand”, suggests it could serve as a 
future central institution of global energy governance.	 17 The IEF has 
been fundamental to the establishment of the Joint Organisations Data 
Initiative on oil (JODI-Oil) and more recently, JODI-Gas, both of which 
have added to transparency in each commodity’s respective market. 
However, to date, the IEF has principally operated as a forum for high-
level networking for energy ministers, and is much less fully formed as a 
governance institution when compared to the IEA. Given the low level of 
interest in establishing a treaty-based ‘World Energy Organisation’,18 this 
leaves the IEA as the best-placed energy-focused institution for being 
elevated into a role that can cope with the aforementioned energy 
challenges. 
To date, the IEA’s efforts to work more closely with major emerging 
economies have been positive, but minimal. On face value, this is 
unsurprising, as the major energy consuming industrialised countries 
have relied upon the IEA as a locus for coordinating their efforts against 
interruptions in energy supply since the 1970s. Indeed, the IEA was 
established under the broad objective of coordinating policy practices 
between OECD states that would bolster price and supply stability in 
global energy markets. There is also no denying that a key inspiration for 
the agency was for it to serve as a counterbalance against the growing 
influence of OPEC in the mid-1970s. Rather than allowing the global 
energy market to break down into a ‘noodle bowl’ of bilateral agreements 
between major consumer countries and OPEC, the IEA was tasked in 
1974 with facilitating harmonisation between the energy policies of major 
Western countries. The IEA was tasked with ensuring that any OPEC-
induced rise in the price of oil would not lead to a repeat of the zero-sum 
‘competitive stockpiling’ that had led to the economic dislocation of the 
early 1970s.  
Notably, this led to the establishment of strategic oil reserves within IEA 
member states, of up to 90 days worth of consumption, to be deployed in 
the event of any future sudden shortage. These stockpiles have been 
utilised on three occasions: the Gulf crisis in 1990-1991, during 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and during the Libyan crisis in 2011 that 
shook the oil market. However, while the IEA’s treaty-based origin as an 
offshoot of the OECD made initial sense, the continued restriction of IEA 
membership to OECD members that meet certain democratic and 
market economy criteria, now serves as an institutional legacy that in 
fact impedes the IEA’s future vitality as a global energy governance 
actor.  
                                                          
17 International Energy Forum, “Member Countries,” May 2014, Available at: 
http://www.ief.org/about-ief/organisation/member-countries.aspx. 
18 David Cameron, “Governance for Growth: Building Consensus for the Future,” 
(London, November 2011). 
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Thus, if the current membership of the IEA wishes to preserve the 
relative influence of the institution, then the forum must become more 
inclusive of emerging markets, and less anchored to its traditional 
concentration on oil and gas commodities. The November 2013 
declaration from the non-OECD energy ministers of Brazil, India, China, 
Indonesia, Russia and South Africa19 that welcomed closer cooperation 
with the IEA via an ‘association’ was an important step, but it also 
indirectly highlighted the sizeable hurdles that must be overcome before 
these ‘partner’ countries have comparable influence within the IEA to its 
current OECD-only membership. Such a shift requires a political impetus 
– without an active push for IEA reform from current member states, 
major emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (the ‘BRICS’) may push for an alternative model where the OECD 
members play a smaller role than they otherwise might in a renewed 
IEA.  
Another major reason for elevating the IEA’s role is that, historical 
political legacies aside, it has greatly expanded the scope of its mission 
since its foundation, and is now well placed to form the basis of an 
inclusive model of mutually beneficial cooperation that works in the 
interests of both OECD and non-OECD states. In particular, the IEA’s 
advanced functional capacity means it is now the primary multilateral 
agency for advising its member states on: 
 
• The outlook for oil and gas markets 
• The latest compilations of international energy data 
• Coordinating ‘emergency preparedness and the use of emergency 
stocks’ 
• Promoting best-practice energy policies20 
 
Both OECD and non-OECD states alike would have much to gain from 
stronger data collection and dissemination around their respective 
access to, and need for, energy resources. Although China and India 
have some way to go in terms of willingness or capacity to accurately 
capture and disclose their domestic energy data, the IEA should 
nevertheless abandon its own artificial and out-dated barriers that pre-
                                                          
19 IEA, “Joint Declaration by the IEA and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and 
South Africa on the Occasion of the 2013 Ministerial Meeting Expressing Mutual Interest 
in Pursuing an Association,” (Paris, 2013). 
20 Energy Research Institute National Development and Reform Commission and 
Grantham Institute for Climate Change, “Consultation Draft Report: Global Energy 
Governance Reform and China's Participation,” (February 2014) Available at: 
https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/climatechange/Public/pdfs/Global%20Energy%20Gove
rnance%20Reform%20and%20China%27s%20Participation.pdf. 
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emptively negate such an outcome – primarily, the restriction of IEA 
membership to only OECD countries. It is also true that the IEA has 
other attributes that, without sufficient planning, could be weakened by 
bringing in BRICS, but valuable functions such as the 90-day oil reserve 
agreement could still operate with or without the newer members’ 
involvement, as the stockpiling requirement could be turned into a final, 
but not entry-phase criterion of IEA membership. Yet whatever the 
negotiated requirements for IEA membership ultimately look like, the 
agency’s future relevance, and its primary position in global energy 
governance, depends upon a more inclusive shift away from the status 
quo. 
 
WHICH LEADERS? 
So far, this paper has outlined some of the major future energy 
challenges, and offered a proposition on how multilateral energy 
governance might begin to meet them. This leaves the question of ‘who’ 
– who can apply a disruptive force that jolts the global energy 
governance system out of its current state of twentieth century inertia? 
As this paper has dealt with policy challenges that cross state 
boundaries, it is clear that any strengthening of multilateral energy 
governance will require the endorsement and support of actors that have 
the authority and mandate to engage (or disengage) in multilateral 
cooperation. That is, the political executives of states.  
Inclusive change will not come simply because the secretariats of the 
IEA, IRENA or IPCC recommend it. Also, as outlined earlier, few if any 
bilateral relationships are capable of meaningfully tackling global climate 
change, meeting future global energy demands or ending energy 
poverty. The possible exception here might be a US-China ‘G2’, as the 
participation of both countries will be essential to the future success of 
any major multilateral initiative. However, although it would be greatly 
welcomed, it is not clear that reform of the IEA is going to be a major 
international priority for the United States without external 
encouragement (one need only look at its delay on passing IMF reform), 
or that the agency will receive public support from China – a current non-
member.  
Realistically, in the post-global financial crisis era, only one global 
governance body has demonstrated the potential to catalyse the kind of 
reform that is required – the Group of Twenty (G20). Indeed, a major 
contribution of the G20 has been in advancing governance reform in the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in a way that recognises the 
ongoing and expected future redistribution of global economic power and 
wealth. In particular, the G20 has successfully managed to oversee an 
expansion in both the mandate and membership of the Financial Stability 
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Forum – now the Financial Stability Board.21 It has also been a central 
political conduit for promoting IMF quota reform, and it has boosted the 
status of anti-corruption initiatives such as the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption.22 The G20 has also strengthened the 
level of collaboration between major economic institutions such as the 
IMF, World Bank and OECD. Arguably, the G20 leaders should spend 
much more of their time strategically thinking about how to galvanise 
reform in other institutions than in attempting to directly tackle complex 
issues from within the G20 – something that is particularly true for global 
energy governance.  
Although this paper began by linking the act of turning on a power switch 
to the high-level world of global energy governance, there is no denying 
that conveying the need to address the challenges listed above to the 
broader public will not be easy. However, the key advantage of the G20 
is that it brings together the leaders from twenty major economies, on 
the basis that they have the greatest agential capacity to navigate 
through the tensions that arise between domestic political concerns and 
the gains to be made from realising global public goods. A stronger 
system of global multilateral energy governance is such a global public 
good – it is clearly necessary if risks like future shortages of energy 
supply, climate change and energy poverty are to be overcome, or even 
addressed.  
While the G20 currently has a number of energy issues on its work 
program, it has not adequately addressed the prior need for a revision of 
the global energy governance system itself. This must be the first step. 
Specifically, one outcome from the forthcoming Brisbane G20 Summit 
should be the explicit acknowledgement of the need for a global forum 
that focuses on energy challenges, and brings together all the major 
countries that will most heavily rely upon global energy markets in the 
twenty-first century, on an equal basis. This should be followed by a 
work plan that focuses on elevating the IEA to fill this role. As outlined, 
the IEA is the best-placed institution for being elevated into this role. Yet 
this reform will only happen if it is catalysed from a sufficiently influential 
group of political leaders. It is well within the G20 leaders’ capacity to 
claim the political credit for being that group. 
                                                          
21 G20 Studies Centre, G20 Monitor No. 4: Financial Regulation and the G20, (Sydney: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014) Available at: 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/financial-regulation-and-g20. 
22 Hugh Jorgensen, “Hard Graft: The G20 and Anti-Corruption,” in G20 Monitor No. 6: 
Tax, Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013). 
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A PATH BEYOND BALI 
SHINICHI KITAJIMA1 
 
THE EXPECTATION FOR THE ROLE OF THE WTO 
AFTER THE 9TH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference that took place in Bali, Indonesia, in 
December 2013 brought a pleasant surprise to all those promoting 
global trade liberalisation. With the WTO having faced an impasse for 
many years, it finally experienced a breakthrough, even if it was only a 
small trigger. As a result, expectations regarding the role of the WTO as 
an international organisation that promotes global trade liberalisation 
have recovered. We should certainly take advantage of this momentum 
built after the Bali Agreement, and in this regard, the role of Director 
General Azevedo is crucial. Efforts to formulate the Doha Round Work 
Program under the leadership of Director General Azevedo should be 
fully supported, in order to not lose the momentum post-Bali.  
At the same time, various regional trade agreements are being 
negotiated, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). While the 
multilateral trade negotiation under the WTO has been revived, efforts to 
promote these regional trade agreements (RTAs) should also be 
maintained. Achieving successes in RTAs in line with the WTO 
framework is essential, since the RTAs and multilateral trade 
negotiations under the WTO should be complementary. For instance, in 
Japan’s case, Japan continues to put great importance on the 
multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO while enhancing various 
RTAs such as the TPP, Japan-European Union Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and 
many other bilateral EPAs.  
In this regard, July 2014 marks an important milestone in trade 
negotiations. First, the G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting will be held in 
Sydney on 19 July. This meeting is expected to enhance coordination 
among the G20 members on free trade and to build momentum towards 
the G20 Brisbane Summit in November. It is important for all the G20 
member countries, both developed and emerging countries alike, to 
show their commitment towards trade liberalisation, especially in the fight 
against protectionism. Second, July is also a critical time in the WTO 
process, since it is the deadline month in which developing countries 
have to make a pledge in line with the trade facilitation agreement. 
Therefore, July is an important moment for all of us to reaffirm our 
                                                          
1 Senior Adjunct Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs. 
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commitment and determination and to ensure there is a follow-up 
process to the Bali meeting. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE GROWTH STRATEGIES AND 
TRADE 
One of the major goals of this year’s G20 process is to develop and 
achieve a ‘Comprehensive Growth Strategy’, and trade is an essential 
factor to promote economic growth. Recently, the issue of global value 
chains (GVCs) has drawn attention as an important element that 
promotes economic growth. GVCs are seen as game changers that 
have brought about a closer and better-linked world. To ensure global 
economic growth, efforts to develop GVCs should be further enhanced. 
Towards this end, Japan is focusing on a concept of ‘cold chains’. This is 
based on an idea that it is essential to provide support for developing 
countries to build thorough value chains, from food production to market 
distribution. ‘Cold chains’ are especially important in places such as 
Africa, where a lack of infrastructure to transport agricultural products 
leads to a large amount of food loss. As a result, Japan considers it is 
necessary to provide assistance in infrastructure, including ‘cold chains’, 
which enable agricultural products to be refrigerated and prevent food 
loss. Building such infrastructure is an essential part of GVCs, and we 
need to strengthen our cooperation in this respect. 
 
FIGHT AGAINST PROTECTIONISM 
Last but not least, our fight against protectionism continues to be a 
significant outcome of the G20. We agreed at the G20 St Petersburg 
Summit last year to ‘extend until the end of 2016 our standstill 
commitment’ and ‘reaffirm commitment to roll back new protectionist 
measures’. But without implementing our agreement and maintaining our 
commitment, we cannot ensure trade liberalisation at a global level. By 
constantly reminding ourselves of this agreement, it deters us from 
taking any further protectionist measures. 
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